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PREFACE 
 
 In the last 50 years, we have had approximately 40 events with 
characteristics related to financial crisis. The most severe crisis was in 
1929, when the financial markets plummet and the US gross domestic 
product decline in more than 30 percent. Recently some years ago, a 
new crisis developed in the United States, but instantly caused 
consequences and effects in the rest of the world. 
This new economic and financial crisis has increased the interest 
and motivation for the academic community, professors and 
researchers, to understand the causes and effects of the crisis, to learn 
from it. This is the one of the main reasons for the compilation of this 
book, which begins with a meeting of a group of IAFI researchers from 
the University of Barcelona, where researchers form Mexico and Spain, 
explain causes and consequences of the crisis of 2007. 
For that reason, we believed this set of chapters related to 
methodologies, applications and theories, would conveniently explained 
the characteristics and events of the past and future financial crisis 
This book consists in 3 main sections, the first one called “State of the 
Art and current situation”, the second named “Econometric applications 
to estimate crisis time periods” , and the third one “Solutions to diminish 
the effects of the crisis ”. The first section explains the current point of 
view of many research papers related to financial crisis, it has 2 chapters. 
In the first one, it describe and analyzes the models that historically have 
been used to explain financial crisis, furthermore, it proposes to used 
alternative methodologies such as Fuzzy Cognitive Maps. On the other 
hand , Chapter 2 , explains the characteristics and details of the 2007 
crisis from the US perspective and its comparison to 1929 crisis, presenting 
some effects in Mexico and Latin America. 
 ix 
The second section presents two econometric applications to 
estimate possible crisis periods. For this matter, Chapter 3, studies 3 Latin-
American countries: Argentina, Brazil and Peru in the 1994 crisis and 
estimates the multifractal characteristics to identify financial and 
economic distress. 
Chapter 4 explains the crisis situations in Argentina (2001), Mexico 
(1994) and  the recent one in the United States (2007) and its effects in 
other countries through a financial series methodology related to the 
stock market. 
The last section shows an alternative to prevent the effects of the 
crisis. The first chapter explains the financial stability effects through the 
financial system regulation and some globalization standards. Chapter 6, 
study the benefits of the Investor activism and a way to protect personal 
and  national wealth to face the financial crisis risks. 
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PART I 
 
STATE OF THE ART AND 
CURRENT SITUATION 
 2 
CHAPTER 1 
ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL CRISIS 
MODELS: 
CAN SCIENCE EXPLAIN FINANCIAL 
CRISES WITH THE EXISTENT MODELS? 
 
Martha Rodríguez • Gabriela Torres • Jorge Castillo 
• Klender Cortez 
 
Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León, Centro de Desarrollo Empresarial 
y Posgrado de FACPYA 
 
Abstract: In order to analyze the models that have been used in the 
economic and financial history we can see how each model was 
adapted to its own context to explain the financial crisis of its moment. It 
is hard to think that the first, second and third generation models of 
financial crisis are capable to explain the present world financial crisis. In 
this paper we expound the reasons and propose an alternate 
methodology, as a part of the non conventional models, the Fuzzy 
Cognitive Maps could be a methodology to explain the present 
financial crisis. 
 
Key Words: Financial Crisis Models, Mexico, Fuzzy Cognitive Maps. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Which empiric models have tried to elucidate the financial crisis? 
Basically, the first, second and third generation models as well as the 
non conventional models are considered. 
Financial crises are mainly derived by significative change in 
quantitative variables as well as in qualitative variables, Ozkan et al. 
(2008), Liu & Lindholm  (2007), Protasi (2001), establish a list of indicators 
of financial crisis: current account deficit which begins to be a critical 
indicator when exceeds in 5% as a percentage of GDP (Gross Domestic 
Product), according to Liu & Lindholm (2007). Lacking flow of capital 
account to cover the current account deficit, or, must be covered by a 
decrease in net foreign assets. Foreign currency reserves are not 
sufficient to sustain the exchange rate, since generally a collapse in the 
outflows of capital comes from not being able to sustain the exchange 
rate. Interest paid on external debt may not be covered by the capital 
account. Increase in external debt as a percentage of GDP; GDP 
decline; Decrease in the rate of nominal Exchange term; and the index 
of real exchange rate. Weak financial regulation and high investor 
speculation. Each of these indicators has a threshold and to reach that 
threshold is when you can anticipate the emergence of a financial crisis, 
Liu & Lindholm (2007). 
 
2. Financial Crisis Models  
 
The analysis of models initiated since 1979, with the first generation 
models which explain the changeable financial crisis, as a predictable 
but inevitable event, derived from the inconsistency of fiscal policy with 
the exchange and monetary rate, that is to say the purpose of the 
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monetary authority is to preset a policy of fixed exchange rate, but 
simultaneously with the budget deficit. 
The first generation models arise from imbalances in the public 
sector (balance of payments) caused by speculative and decline in 
international reserves,  with the work of Paul Krugman (1979), based on 
the model from Kouri (1976) and the work of  Salant & Hederson (1978). 
However, the Krugman (1979) model is subject to two important 
limitations, which he concludes: the model is based on a highly 
simplified macro-economic model; this means that the analysis of the 
factors from the balance of payments is incomplete. On the other hand, 
it is impossible to consider assuming only two assets to reflect the reality. 
In more realistic models the exchange rate would have to be stabilized 
with an open financial market. Flood & Garber (1984), Connolly & Taylor 
(1984), Sachs (1986), Wijnbergen (1988) y Dooley (2000), extend the work 
of Krugman (1979).  
The synchrony between reality and the theoretic models from the 
first generation made think that the unique cause for exchange crises 
was the public deficit. However, the crises on the emerging countries 
have shown that the currency crises are related to the stock market 
crises. García (2005), performs an analysis of several empirical studies 
which rely on the first generation models, he says that these models 
have a better explanation for the crises prior to the nineties.  
The second generation models of financial crisis appear in the 
mid-80’s, where expectations test the performance of the auto crisis, 
where a financial crisis may or may not occur.  
Obstfeld (1986), author of the Basic model from the second 
generation, focuses on the relationship of expectations from the 
domestic agents on the decrease of the exchange rate, considers 
devaluation as a decision of the governments, indicating that the 
financial crisis may appear even if the fundamental variables are 
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favorable and there are no speculative assaults. Garber (1996), based 
on the Obstfeld (1986) model and Eichengreen, Rose, & Wyplosz (1996) 
add the speculative assaults identifying the foundations from the first 
generation models. Mishkin (1992), assures that one of the reasons of the 
financial crises is precisely the asymmetric information, being based on 
the fragility of the structure of debts that are used for speculation.  
The third generation models arise after the financial crisis of East 
Asia and join the monetary crisis and the fragility of the financial sector 
and contagion from other countries. Valdés (1997), explains how the 
necessity of liquidity for investors drives to contagion effects. Kaminsky & 
Reinhart (1998), use contagion concepts: trade relations and direct 
trade competition between countries or indirectly in a third market. 
Eichengreen et al. (1996), Kaminsky & Reinhart (1998), demonstrate that 
growth of private and public credit are indicators of currency crisis, and 
state that the second generation models cannot be used to explain 
other financial crises where the trade balance is not an indicator of 
monetary crisis, as well as the first generation models.  
Morris & Shin (1998) build a theoretical game model with 
asymmetric information about fundamentals of the speculators. Calvo 
(1998) attributes contagion to lack on financial market liquidity. Kodres & 
Pritsker (2002), argue that countries with a high degree of mobility in their 
assets shown with the assets of countries that are experiencing a 
financial crisis could be vulnerable to contagion via market relations. 
Forbes & Rigobon (2002), analyze the stock market during 1997 in Asia, 
94 in Mexico and the 1987 crash of U.S. stock market, they define 
contagion as a substantial increase on correlation between stock 
market during instability.   
Corsetti et al. (1999), consider an optimization model of 
intertemporal equilibrium of a situation of moral hazard (risk transfer), 
 6 
and is exercised by the banking activity and firms operating under the 
presumption that they will be insured against contingencies.  
Luiz de Mello et al. (2001), considers how exchange rate 
movements affect foreign debt portfolios, uses a dynamic panel model, 
the reason of exchange rate movements depends not only on this one, 
but as well on external debt. The work of Bakeart et. al (2002) and 
Lagunes & Watkins (2008) motivates Rodríguez, Cortez & Torres (2008) to 
create an analysis on the contagion effects, for the case of México 1994 
as a not anticipated crisis to Argentina 1994, Argentina 2001 anticipated 
to México and United States 2007 anticipated to México july 2008. 
Nevertheless, the analysis of financial crisis mentioned from the 
first, second and third generation cannot be used as early systems to 
identify financial crises; the results of these studies are diverse and 
remain a significant site for further investigation, Liu & Lindholm (2007). 
 
3. Non Conventional Models of Financial Crisis  
 
The episodes of the 90´s financial crisis have induced the 
development of models with a predictive value on an attempt to 
convey an empiric action which helps comprehend and clarify better 
these events; and in any case diminish the negative effects that it has 
on economy. 
Protasi (2001) assures that a financial crisis is impossible to predict, 
but alert indicators can be built which will aid monitor if a country is 
heading for a financial crisis. Also, considers that there is a theoretical or 
practical limitation in attempting to predict a crisis, since it will have a 
set of parameters associated with variables, to be estimated with cross 
data and the success of the anticipation of a crisis depends on what are 
appropriate values for the parameters of the country. Many of the 
existing empirical studies have focused on modeling currency crisis and 
 7 
early warning systems, using data sets from field through various 
economic techniques.  
Amongst them, the work of Kaminsk & Reinhart (1998), who 
proposes an approach to the extraction of the signal, which refers often, 
as the indicator approach KLR, the preceding financial crisis is based on 
a probability model, Liu & Lindholm (2007). Alvarez-Plata & Schrooten 
(2004), Chowdhry & Goyal (2000) and Protasi (2001), are the authors of 
theoretical and empirical studies on early signal determining factors of 
financial crises. For a model to be considered as an effective indicator 
of a financial crisis it must be able to anticipate the crises which are 
produced out of the estimation period, Protasi (2001).  
Kamisnky, Lizondo & Reinhart (KLR) monitor a great deal of 
monthly indicators which signal a financial crisis if they surpass certain 
warning limits. Current account deficit exceeds 5% of GDP; a lower level 
of reserves to three months of imports is alert status for a country. 
However, its low level of prediction results to be poor when the weighted 
indicator warns of a crisis in Asia, the probability of occurrence was 37%. 
Berg & Patillo (1999) use a probity methodology and add other 
variables such as the level of current account, the M2 to reserves and 
the stock of short-term debt, inspired in the Asian crisis of 97. 
On the other hand, Frankel & Rose (1996), estimate the crisis 
probability for a set of countries using similar basic indicators of KLR, but 
adding indicators of external liabilities. Sachs, Turnell and Velasco (1996) 
restrict their attention to cross-section data in 1995, analyzing the tequila 
effect; emphasizing the interactions between vulnerable banking 
systems, overrated exchange rates and low reserves level. Nonetheless, 
this model as the one from Frankel & Rose (1996) was statistically 
insignificant to explain the Asian crisis, according to Protasi (2001). 
Although it came to predicting the crisis with a 50% of probability 
none of these models were capable of anticipating a timing in which 
 8 
they were bound to happen, specifically with the Asia 1997 example, 
Ozkan et al. (2008). 
The use of Logic Fuzzy with Clustering begins with Dunn (1973), 
Bezdek (1981), Kaufman & Rousseeuw (1990), Hathaway et al. (1989). Liu 
& Lindholm (2007) perform an analysis on visualizing early signals of 
monetary crisis. These authors stopped using the conventional models 
and examined if early signals could be found with a cluster method 
using fuzzy logic with a fuzzy exponent, on the monetary crisis of Finland 
in 1992. The fuzzy theory offers Liu & Lindholm (2007), the media to 
handle the inherent uncertainty in a great variety of tasks, especially 
when uncertainty is not a random result but the result of unknown 
factors and relations that are difficult to explain. In addition, they state 
that imprecise values can be treated as well as model non lineal 
relations.  
With the Fuzzy clustering algorithm methodology, the use of Logic 
Fuzzy with Clustering, unlike the traditional  use of clusters, is that the use 
of fuzzy logic makes possible the created sets and gives to each 
element a sense of belonging between each other, which makes it 
even more flexible. 
Oskan et al. (2008) propose an analysis on monetary crisis based 
on the decision theory, using fuzzy logic using clusters with medium C-
medias, based upon a decision source.  It studies hidden behavior of 
market participants during crisis, and with this analysis creates catalogs 
to build an opinion based on an array of balance of payments. It 
includes data from the Turkish economy which covers two monetary 
crises.  
On the other hand, publications using artificial neural networks were 
found, these classify the phases in which economies can be found; and, 
if there are indicative characteristics of a possible financial crisis (Oscar 
Pérez et. al, 2008). An important limitation of previous work is that in 
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financial crises a large number of interrelated qualitative and 
quantitative variables are involved. 
This is why Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCM) appear to be a 
methodological tool which resolve the introduction of qualitative 
variables. The application of structured models from first, second and 
even third generation for financial crises is challenged by the lack of 
inclusion of qualitative variables or assumptions which determine each 
model; very few emerging as it was previously reviewed. Nonetheless, 
the models which include fuzzy logic may be a methodological tool, 
Ozkan (2007) that solves the relation and impact in each variable, as 
well as the introduction of qualitative variables, and the significance of 
their relationship. 
Below is a summary where there are  the principal authors of each 
model form the three generations of models of financial crisis and where 
we focus our approach as proposal, Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCM). 
As, Liu & Lindholm (2006) and Ozkan (2007), argue that the 
inclusion of the fuzzy cognitive maps or fuzzy logic, offer tools which are 
able to deal with the inherente uncertainty in a great deal of variables, 
especially when uncertainty is not a random result but a result of 
unknown factors and relations that are difficult to explain. Rodríguez 
(2004), argues that the (FCM) are a methodology that solves the 
introduction of qualitative variables in a model; Rodríguez & Cortez 
(2008) also argue that the FCM appear to be a methodological tool 
which aids model financial crises for its huge amount of both 
quantitative and qualitative variables that are involved.    
 
4. Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCM) 
 
Close-up to the FCM as a method of financial crisis simulation 
 10 
The most important change in the use of Cognitive Maps (CM) was 
given by Axelrod (1976) when he presented the first systematic study of 
the CM in political science and the theory of decision. This author 
proposed the use of the CM in the representation of the social scientific 
knowledge. This methodology was applied during the 80s and is still used 
in political science. Ten years after the work of Axelrod, Kosko (1986) 
introduced the blur, what supposes that events are not entirely true or 
false, this is, they are presented in certain degree Bojadziev and 
Bojadziev (2007). The contribution of Kosko (1986) led to what we name 
Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCM). The FCM are structures that help represent 
complex dynamic models. Their use extends to the fields of political 
science, medicine, economy, and meteorology, among others. 
            According to Kosko (1986) the FCM are fuzzy graphic structures 
that represent a causal reasoning. Their blur allows fuzzy degrees of 
causality among blurred concepts. Their graphic structure allows 
systematic causal propagations, in particular, chains (liaisons) backward 
and forward, which permits that the bases of knowledge grow through 
these connections. Each one of the concepts of the map will be a fuzzy 
set, so the denomination of the diagram is usually called FCM. 
            To build a FCM it is necessary to consider 3 stages: 1) the 
identification of the concepts, 2) the determination of the causal 
relations and finally 3) the dynamics of the map. Below, each one of 
them will be explained. In the first stage, the designer of the FCM 
proposes a nodes collection or concepts to a specific problem. This 
phase is vital since the inclusion or exclusion of variables could damage 
the future operation of the FCM. In the second stage, the matrix known 
as E and the graphic of the FCM are obtained, this is the relations 
(weights) of causality between the nodes that will intervene in the FCM. 
            The knowledge that the FCM are not supervised since the causal 
structure of the world is unknown. To obtain these relations, the designer 
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of the FCM must select between two possible forms. The first one refers to 
a subjective form and the second, through the construction of a 
neuronal artificial network (NAN) to obtain the weights of the nodes 
across the historical sequence of data. 
            If the subjective form is chosen, the knowledge will be easy to 
obtain through the opinion or questioning of specialists in the field under 
study. Each one of the specialists draws their causal graphics or BCMs, 
including or excluding the nodes that they believe will intervene in the 
study. A questionnaire of the influence of a concept versus another can 
be presented, offering various blurred alternatives, represented 
symbolically, that will be translated, after, to numeric values associated 
to the connections. 
            On the other hand, if the designer of the FCM has no idea of the 
weights, a NAN to obtain the weights between the nodes could be 
implemented. 
            The NAN is similar to the Hopfield one, but the difference resides in 
the employment of a different learning algorithm known as hebbian 
differencial algorithm, Kosko (1986) and Kosko (1997). 
            In the third stage, the threshold function is selected and the 
dynamics of the map is obtained. The matrix E is a matrix that can be 
stimulated through the entrance vectors, which can be done through 
the multiplication of the vector-matrix. The above can be expressed as 
follows: ( )
njiij
e ≤≤= ,1E : Matrix of causal arches, )(),...,(),()(
~
21 tCtCtCtC n= : 
Ordered list of records. What happens if…? They are questions in discrete 
time t, = EoC~ iEC~∑ ⋅ Refers to an ordered list of consequences. This 
means that the FCM turns into a dynamic computer system of questions 
“What if I turn the node i on?” and the answers through the operation of 
the product, until going up to an equilibrium in longitudinal limit cycles 
 12 
terms q=1,2,...m. Where m is the number of repetitions of the exit vector 
(consequences).  
Going further on this methodology, see, Rodriguez and Cortez 
(2008) where they build  a FCM applied to the financial crsis of Mexico of 
1994 through expert hypothesis, this is, in a subjective manner. The results 
obtained correspond to the presentation of a method that helps relate 
qualitative and quantitative variables. The above could be applied not 
only to the economic field, as it was done here, but to any investigation 
field. In the article, a set of variables and relations obtained through 
economic articles of the time are proposed.  
Adding the hypothesis (assumption) the authors observe that the 
excessive over-valuation gets to augment the risk of the country, 
decreases trust and lowers credibility to the leaders, so the international 
reserves are diminished, causing the financial crisis. All of these, in a 
model where adjustment politics do not influence, makes the economy 
evolve to a point of economic crisis. The procurement of weights through 
data patterns would be missing to considerate, since it would be a more 
reliable way to capture the reality, for this, NAN and diverse auto-
adjustment mechanisms of weights could be considered, to ponder the 
non-linear dynamics of the reality of the financial crisis. 
    
Conclusions 
 
               The problematic of a financial crisis is extremely complex, where a 
numberless quantity of financial, economic, social, ethical, 
technological and human behavior factors intervene and affect in the 
financial operations. It is not feasible to consider a traditional model that 
could explain the financial crisis, since every context is unique and 
unrepeatable. 
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               When the analysis of the models of financial crisis are conceived, 
the current investigation is an effort to propose a methodology of 
advanced investigation, that uses blurred logic, construction of Fuzzy 
Cognitive Maps (FCM). The use of FCM will allow the inclusion of 
qualitative variables in the model, like speculation or financial regulation. 
               With the FCM, a systematic process based in fuzzy logic to the 
principal causes of the financial crisis will be sought to emulate. It cannot 
be forgotten that a proposal on FCM that shows a simple evolution (but 
true) and that resembles reality is given. This FCM can be the beginning 
to more sophisticated FCM. Like investigation lines, it is proposed to 
simulate a more complex reality of the crisis through data patterns and 
weights updates. 
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INTERNATIONAL CRISIS  2007-2009.  
EFFECTS IN MEXICO 
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Empresarial y Posgrado de FACPYA 
 
Abstract: This academic papers presents the international crisis not as a 
cause but as a consequence of the economic and financial 
characteristics of the people, companies and public policies and habits 
of the US and other countries. We present some of the facts of the US 
country as saving rates, debt and other factor that help us understand 
this crisis and to be able to understand the size compared to other crisis 
in other countries or other crisis before, such as the 1929 crisis. 
We also present the perspective of Mexico and Latin America 
countries and their characteristics, such as economic indexes and 
growth in the last 20 years. We also mentioned our dependency to US 
economy and our disadvantage of not taking opportunities in Asia as a 
growing economy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The World “crisis” comes from latin roots” crisis” that has, 
according to Real Spanish Language Academy ( RAE, 2009 ) several 
meanings such as: 
1. Decisve moment in a serious business and of difficult and 
important consequences. 
2. Scarceness, famine. 
3. Difficult or complex situation. 
In the particular case in the economic- financial situation that 
the World is living nowadays, including Latin-American countries, 
fulfills the definition according to the situation and circumstances we 
are all living in. 
The difference in this recent crisis compared to the past crisis, is 
the development and interaction of the countries, commercial 
bridges that have been built  between them, and the technological 
advance, in particular of the so called “ 4th power “, the power of 
the media, the mass media. 
 As it has extensively been in the media, this crisis situation, 
particularly the “ subprime mortgage “ (low quality home mortgages 
)was where it all started , practically it ignited the international 
financial crisis, but analyzing a bit further, this subprime crisis was not 
the cause but one of the consequences that we will probably have 
to pay. This was the tip of the iceberg, because, it led us analyze the 
weakness in the financial and economic policies in terms of 
consumption and saving from the personal levels to companies and 
governments, and because of these, the effects of the recession in 
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the US and the financial epidemic actions in all other countries, will 
have us re-think the consumption habits and income-outcome 
policies in this 3 economic agents. 
It is a Fact, that one of the main difference with other crisis, like 
the Mexican “ the Tequila effect “ in 1994, or the “ Samba effect” in 
Brazil a, is that this last one, originated in US, will be beeper in its 
effects, ( recession and unemployment ) and more difficult to 
predict in its length. The dimensions and consequences of this crisis 
have been compared to the crisis in 1929, the great depression, due 
to the next issues:  
- Rescue Funds to financial institutions and Industry. 
- Demand and debt levels in the US vs World levels. 
- Internacional interdependence and financial instruments 
exhange. 
- Unemployment levels and interest rates. 
- Decrease in Stock Markets indexes of the most important 
markets in the World. 
As we say here in Mexico, the one who does not know its history, it is 
deemed to repeat it “, thus why we will see some facts in history that we 
would try to link to the present situation.  
In several digital media, it was shown the thought presented below, 
by Thomas Jefferson: 
“I believe that banking institutions are more dangerous to our liberties 
than standing armies. If the American people ever allow private banks to 
control the issue of their currency, first by inflation, then by deflation, the 
banks and corporations that will grow up around the banks will deprive 
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the people of all property until their children wake-up homeless on the 
continent their fathers conquered. “ THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1802.
This phrase written in 1802 that could be presented as a 
premonition, it should be analyzed to the detail, because it points out 
the weakness and strengths of the financial system and the interaction 
with the World economy. 
Milton Friedman reminds us that the capitalism system is not only 
based in profit but on losses too,  and this tells us that economic cuycles 
have been through out the history of all countries and world economy. 
Furthermore, we should ask ourselves the question : is this crisis a 
cause or the consequence of a wrong political and economical policy 
thru the years ? is the subprime crisis, was it the root of the crisis of better 
yet, the first of a series of financial events such as card credit crisis, 
productivity crisis, and many more to see  ? 
Meditating about these thought , we continue our study, with the “ 
Dow Jones  Industrial Average “ and its path since 1905. 
I want to point out 2 things: 1) the 1929 drop, was approximately 
90% and the other drop cause by the international turbulence was about 
35% to 40 % depending in the time period of the comparisons and 2 ) the 
recovery time in years for the index to be in the same level it started 
before the crisis, in 1929, it took the US about 18 to 20 years, and the 
scene in 2009, is that many countries including the US, will be out of the 
crisis path this year, at the most. This will be about 2 to 3 years recovery 
for this crisis to have the same stock index levels, of course, with different 
level of government support. 
Other comparative data to measure the effect of the crisis, is that in 
this particular case, and to the contrary of what we are used to as 
latinoamercians, is that the origin of this crisis is with the US, and with  
turbuilence in the financial, housing and banking industry. Some data to 
analyze is: 
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- US Male Consumer Age average: 41 years old , 
Female : 39 years old. 
- Joint Anual Income : $67,300 US Dlls 
- Basically  2 important assetss: 
o House  ( Mortgage )  
o 401K ( Retirement Account ) 
- Everything else , based on credit. 
- 5% of the world population. 
- 30% of the world production. 
- 40% of Global Comsumpption (Demand ). 
- Gross Domestic Product (GDP)  US$13.8 trillions 
 
These facts, give us a reference frame of the consumption and 
participation of the US in the World Economy and the effect that cause 
any country that will have commercial trading with it, particularly  the 
case of Mexico. 
Everything started  in the year 2001 thru 2004, where the real interest 
rates started to be negative, and the excess of money and investments 
were reflected in the real state industry, creating  excess liquity in this 
investment segment, and a general increase ( bubble ) in prices and 
quantities in real states transactions. 
Further on, this increase in the housing bubble and the real estate 
market, reflects its increase in terms of pricing and quantity, that 
reached its peaked in 2005 with the subprime crisis, that captured al 
that excess of investments and the so called bubble market, that lasted 
with a bull trend with at least 20 years. This peak was an adjustment in 
price valuation of the housing investment. 
As it can be analyzed in the above graph,  the volumen of the 
new houses as well as the used ones dimish considerably, reflecting 
differences in pricing up to 25 % in the year 2009. this was consider a 
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correction in the housing market after the housing bubble many years 
ago. 
Here in this housing market, started a generalized confusion 
between terms of price, value, and risk, primarily in houses, then 
company stocks, and many other financial assets. Risk started to create 
panic threatening the continuing and normal operation of the financial 
services and investments. 
On the other hand, since a couple decades ago, the saving rate 
in the regular US Cititzen, was dimishing in critical levels. These conditions 
have very difficult and important consequences, because any variation 
in the interes rates o prices in good or services, or thru inflation, would 
have a direct impact in the family`s budget, and this would affect their 
spending habits as well as their demand in products or services such as 
restaurant, automotive, or appliances. The mentioned industries strated 
to show weak signals in growth and their financial structures. 
The US average family income, has not grown in the last years, 
and this makes the US familiy`s  economic situation more diffucult and 
not very flexible in  this crisis situation. 
The federal reserve strategy of lowering the interest rates as an 
instrument to activate the economy thru  credit, strated to create a very 
important pressure in the country inflation and the consumption in the 
country. 
On the side of US Federal  resources, a public deficit, and a 
trading deficit  had been growing. This complicates the economic  
situation and its flexibility in the short term and in the long run. 
 Furthermore, the US had financial and economic difficulties, that 
would had an impact in many countries in the whole world. It hard to 
think of any country in the world that would not be affected of this 
adverse economic and financial environment. 
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The magnitude of this economical impact that each country will 
face, will be depending of the funds exchange, money transactions, as 
well as good and service transactions with the US and other countries. In 
the Mexican Case and latinamerica, is it very important that we analyze 
the impact taking into the account this arguments and the level of 
interaction in the US economy, a developed  economy . 
 
2. The Economic And Financial Impact In Mexico 
 
The first thing it came to our mind, when we first heard about the 
US Crisis, was the last Mexican crisis not so long ago, at least so it 
seemed, the “tequila“ crisis in 1994. This was refreshing our memory with 
a clear conscious that it was not a crisis created with in the country, a 
thing we were not very used to. The Secretary of Hacienda was 
mentioning in the media, that if the US was coughing, Mexico was not 
going to get pneumonia, like many other times happened. This time was 
different, or at least so he said. 
He was right in a sense, Mexico as a country, was in a different 
and more robust economic position as it was 10 years ago. 
The graph below shows that Mexico as a country had done its 
homework and it was ready for some international financial turbulence. 
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Table 3.1 Indicators. Source: Citi 
 
The index is a ranking of internal and external cyclical and 
structural measures: inflation, fiscal balances, public debt-to-GDP ratios, 
current account balances, net international reserves to short term debt, 
trade as a share of GDP and foreign direct investment as a share of 
GDP. For each indicator we split the range between the minimum and 
maximum into ten levels, assigning numbers from -5 to +5, with the 
negative number associated with more international exposure or a 
greater vulnerability. The numbers are summed to give the overall 
vulnerability index.  
The Mexican Economic position as it can be seen in the graph, in 
terms of Consumer price index, Public debt, Fiscal Balance, Current 
Account, Foreign Direct Investment, and Reserves it is a complete 
different story ten years ago. 
The “ official government “ position,  as many financial analysts 
agreed, was a very difficult one, difficult to forecast the depth of the 
consequences and how long it would take us to recovery again positive 
GDP for the country. 
It is still a reality that our main sources of incomes as a country 
were at risk with many thoughts:  
- Oil Sales, up to 40% of fiscal budget, Oil Prices have gone below 
50 dlls;  
- Inmigrants Sending Money  have decreased up to 12 %; 
- Manufacturing exports reduced for the first time in 20 years.  85 % 
of export to the US,  mostly automotive. 
- Tourism and foreign investments are paralyzed by 
circumstances. 
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- Unemployment levels increasing. 
From the inside to the outside, the situation looks very difficult. The 
main Index in the stock market the IPC ( indice de precios y 
cotizaciones) went down 33% to around 18,000 points, after being some  
months in the ceiling of 32,000 points. 
What was the question we had to do as financial authors? , What 
was really the point of this crisis, in out hopeful way to a develop 
country? These questions made us look back a little bit in the history of 
the country. 
Was not the international crisis nor the crisis before but the 
structural measures such as devaluation and the loss of purchasing 
power during that last 20 years. These facts, along with the lack of good 
level of growth, seemed that the country had not reached its full 
potential. That this made the poor base society more vulnerable to 
economic changes and that the last crisis , the “ tequila “ crisis created 
around 10 more million poor people. Our levels of poor people in the 
country were reaching about 45 million people of a 105 million 
population in the country. Our dependency in oil prices, our 
dependency in the US as an export destiny, and the close to dying 
maquiladora program, set us up  in a tough position. We had not gone  
forward with  the reform for Oil Refinery, the taxing reform, the 
education reform,  the business creating reform, many thing and 
changes the country needed in order to expand to its potential. The 
optimal economic growth or the country should be around 5%, in order 
to fulfill employment rates as well as growth in our  domestic market.  
Just to mention an example, in the Oil issue , the country congress 
and our politicians have not come to an agreement  to produce 
economic valued added and not export the oil as a mere product, and 
this is causing us to import gasoline as a country. In fact, in 2010, we are 
facing increased prices in gasoline products due to the price in the 
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commodity in the international arena, but this far from being 
competitive, in our economic situation, facing a financial shock in public 
finances, will be hard and will hit poverty more than it has so far. 
The loss of purchasing power due to inflation and lack of 
economic growth, was like a  machine creating poor people and 
polarizing the economy even more. We have to understand this, and 
understand it well. There are no magic formulas. Hard Work , discipline,  
patience, education, are values that had to be taken again by the 
public and the government. 
The international crisis caused a deeper view in our strategy as a 
country and as companies. It has caused to rethink again the root or 
causes of our situation, and our possible consequences or impact in the 
future. 
How we base our economy, and give added value internally and 
internationally, will mark our financial and economic position in the 
future.  
 
3. New opportunities in China, our dependency with United States of 
America 
 
As a weakness more than a strenght, in this crisis period of time, 
stands out, the dependency that not only Mexico but Latinoamerica 
has with  United States  in their regular and common trade. 
Mexico has probably 50 to 60 % of all the imports and exports to 
and from the United States, and this dependency has affected Mexico 
in many industries  for the time from 2007 to 2010. it is fair to say , that all 
the amount of imports and exports to and form Latin-American countries 
have experiences and increase in amount and its percentage.  
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As many financial analysts, politicians and government officials 
have mentioned, our commercial trade with China are very low and 
have room to grow. Not only in terms of imports but in exports to China. 
  
Conclusions 
 
The final thoughts for all these topics mentioned, would be that 
this crisis that was generated in the United States, as less a cause, and 
more of a consequences, or the economic systematic systems and 
habits of the financial system. The difference and  recovery time for 
every country or every company, will be stated  in function of its 
financial habits and saving  rates. If a company was highlty leverage, 
will be having problems of liquity, and its administration. 
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Abstract: Some Latin American markets have been seriously affected by 
the episodes of financial crises during the last 15 years. One way of 
dealing with crises is to find mechanisms and policies that may be 
implemented in order to prevent or face this type of episodes. However, 
one could also try to characterize and anticipate periods of turbulence 
in emerging capital markets through historical technical analysis. In this 
work one does the later by studying the multifractal properties of three 
Latin American emerging markets around the Mexican crisis of 1994: 
Argentina, Brazil and Peru. The analysis of returns is made trough its 
singularity spectrum during the period 1989-2000. By using a crisis-
switching indicator with an empirical threshold, one shows that sudden 
changes in one version of the sequence of Holder exponents preceded 
turbulent periods with about sixty days of anticipation. 
 
 32 
Keywords: Financial crisis, multifractal analysis. 
1. Introduction 
 
The search of a suitable model for price variations is a common 
subject in financial engineering. Along the years different suggestions 
have been made from the first and most known Brownian and Lévy 
diffusion representations, and the GARCH family, to stochastic volatility 
models. In this work, one follows the multifractal approach of price 
variations. 
The reason is that even though some of these models capture a 
good part of the basic price variation properties, like i) lack of return 
correlations; ii) turbulent periods; iii) fat and asymmetric tails of returns 
pdf; iv) returns pdf variation across scales; and v) log normal volatility; 
recent findings Ausloos et al., Brachet (1999) and Sornette Zhou (2006) 
suggest that there is another feature of price change phenomena that 
is not incorporated in these models: multi-scaling of the return partition 
functions. 
Based on these findings, works by Agaev and Kuperin (2004), Los 
and Yalamova (2004), Lovejoy and Schertzer (2002), and Muzy et al. 
(2000) have proposed some alternatives to interpret multifractal patterns 
in financial time series around turbulent periods by means of visual 
induction on the behavior of Hölder exponents. In the first two cases this 
is accomplished by the wavelet-based approach and in the second by 
the analysis of local Hölder exponents related to a previously established 
threshold. 
This work follows the suggestions in the above paragraph, and 
goes one step further by presenting a crisis-switching indicator (CSI) 
based on the path of minimum Hölder exponents at each time period. 
By doing this exercise the objective is to show that there is a pattern 
preceding turbulent periods using some indicators, and not only by 
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)
means of visual induction. Other difference between this approach and 
the former is the use of the moment method in singularity spectrum 
construction based on box-counting computations. 
The reason is that even when this calculation has some 
disadvantages, it is faster to compute than wavelet methods Muzy et al. 
(2000)and Sornette and Zhou (2006). The remainder part of this work is 
divided as follows: in the second section one discusses the story of 
turbulence analysis and multifractal processes showing the links 
between mono- and multifractal processes. The third section deals with 
basic multifractal formalism and introduces the crisis-switching indicator 
proposed for crisis anticipation. In the fourth section one discusses the 
empirical results for the Argentinean (MERVAL), Brazilian (IBOVESPA) and 
Peruvian (IGBVL) markets. The last section concludes the work. 
 
2. Turbulence and Multifractal Formalism 
 
The origins of multifractal theory can be traced back to the works 
of Kolmogorov (1941a), (1941b)and Mandelbrot (1967) (1972), (1975) y 
(1997). Under conditions of fully developed turbulence, variables such as 
the velocity or the local dissipation of energy vary sharply from one 
location to another and cannot be regarded as deterministic quantities 
but as random ones.  
Let, for instance, ( t,δε  be the local dissipation of energy at the 
point  over a neighborhood of radius δ , Kolmogorov’s intuition was 
that the energy is transmitted from the larger scales ( )Δ  to the smaller 
ones (δ ) by means of a injection process defined by a variable Δ δη  
which in fact only depends on the ratio Δ/δ , as 
 
(1)     ( ) ( )tt ,,  Δ= Δεηδε δ  
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In Kolmogorov’s work the energy injection variable Δ δη  has a fixed 
value, 
α
δ
δη
−
Δ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
Δ= , from which it can immediately deduced that the 
order  moments of q ( t, )δε  can be related with those of ( t,Δ )ε  in a very 
simple way, namely 
 
(2)    ( ) ( ) qqqq tt   ,, αα δεδδε −− ∝Δ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
Δ=  
 
All the dependence in equation (l) of the order-q moment is 
concentrated in the power law , what is similar to what 
experimental measures show, namely: 
q αδ −
 
     ( ) )( , qqt τδδε ∝  
 
a property which is known as self-similarity. Unfortunately, the 
exponents  )(qτ  obtained in the experiments have not a linear 
dependence on q  in opposition to the usual linear scaling. To describe 
this “anomalous scaling” Kolmogorov’s decomposition can still be 
applied but now Δ δη  in equation (1) has to be interpreted as a random 
variable, independent of . The property of self-similarity led researchers 
to propose a model for its generation based on the existence of local 
scale-invariant laws. First, it is assumed that at any point t  the following 
equation holds: 
Δ
 
(3)     ( ) tt   , αδδε ∝  
 
That is, all the dependency on the scale parameter δ  is conveyed 
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by the power law factor . The exponent t  αδ tα , which is a function of the 
point  under study, is called the singularity exponent of the point. Then, 
the singularity exponents can be arranged in special sets called 
singularity components , which are defined as: 
t
αF
 
(4)     { }ααα == ttF :  
 
In order to close the model, it is required that the singularity 
components are of fractal character. The singularity spectrum 
associated to the multifractal hierarchy of fractal components is the 
function )(αf  defined by the Hausdorff dimension  of each 
component , namely: 
Hdim
αF
 
(5)     αα Ff Hdim)( =  
 
Following Parisi and Frisch (1985) it is possible to derive a 
relationship between self-similarity exponents )(qτ  and the singularity 
spectrum )(αf . They proved that the self-similar exponents )(qτ  could 
be computed from the Legendre transform of the singularity spectrum 
)(αf : 
 
(6)    { })(inf)( αατ α fdqq −+=  
 
By means of equation (6) it is evident that the singularity spectrum 
contains all the information about self-similarity, that is, it describes the 
statistics of changes in scale.  
The basic hypothesis sustained in this work is that the MERVAL, 
IBOVESPA and IGBVL markets returns' signals are multifractal, meaning 
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that multi-scaling of returns helps to describe real data in a better way 
than in a regular monofractal way. This means that the sequence )(qτ  
describes the scaling behavior of returns absolute moments:   
 
(7)    ∑ ∝=
t
qqtvq )(),(),( τδδδχ  
 
In the same sense as equation (2), and with 
 
∑=
t
tr
tr
tv
),(
),(
),( δ
δδ  
 
Being the normalized version of returns ),(ln)1,(ln),( tPtPtr δδδ −+=  
over a time horizon or distance δ , and  the return moment. q
An intuitive interpretation of multifractals in time series analysis 
consists in thinking of them as a generalization of monofractal models, 
such as the well-known ordinary Brownian motion, with the difference 
that in the former case heterogeneity behavior across time is allowed. 
This of course, has the advantage of avoiding unrealistic long memory 
assumptions of monofractals and shows a well characterization of fat tail 
behavior. Figure 1 shows a comparison between returns modeled from 
an ordinary Brownian motion and the realization of returns in the NYSE1. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
In this section one discusses a moving average-based crisis-switching 
indicator. 
 
3.2. Crisis-Switching Indicator 
                                                           
1 All figures and tables are own elaboration unless stated otherwise. 
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One alternative to analyze the variation of the former multifractal 
characterization consists on estimating the singularity spectrum 
performing a rolling window in a time interval [ ]10 , tt . In this sense, one 
would obtain a series of [ ]wjjF +.α  sets computed in subintervals: , 
. The minimum value for each set can be computed as 
[ ]wjj +,
[ wttj −∈ 10 , ]
 
(8) [ ]{ }wjjt F +
−
= ,min αα , 
 
Considering a rolling window [ ]wjj +,  such that there is a unique tα  for 
each time  and a trajectory t
−
α  is constructed for minimum values only. 
A smooth version of the previous 
−
α  is achieved by means of a moving 
average estimator . This leads to an error function of  
∧
−
tα
  
(9)  
∧
−−
−= ttt ααξ
 
Which is bounded by confidence bands defined as the local maximum 
(upper bound ) and local minimum (lower bound ) of previous 
errors, defining a set of crossing times constructed by the union 
u
tξ ltξ
lu ψψψ ∪=  with  
 
(10) 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ≤=
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ≥=
−
−
l
tt
l
u
tt
u
t
t
ξαψ
ξαψ
:
:
 
 
Where ψ  recovers all periods that cross the bands. 
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Now let )(mψ be the m-th element of ψ , and M be the number of 
crossing times. Then crossing lines are defined as the set of pairs 
 
(11) ( ){ }ludc nmmnmmL ψψψψψψ ∈+∈+= )(,)(:)(),( , and 
 
(12) ( ){ }uluc nmmnmmL ψψψψψψ ∈+∈+= )(,)(:)(),(  
 
With  such that each element in the first set 
( ) is called a down-crossing line if 
MnmMm ≤+≤< ;0
dcL 1=n , and a pendular movement of 
a down crossing line if . A similar reasoning applies for the second 
set ( ), where each element is an up-crossing line if , and a 
pendular movement of an up crossing line if . Figure 2 shows an 
example of how crossing lines may actually look like. 
1>n
ucL 1=n
1>n
Under a turbulence anticipation context crossing lines and 
pendular movements are used as crisis-switching indicators for the 
coming of a crisis. However it is important to mention that the time delay 
from this point to the development of the crisis may be a rather tricky 
issue to anticipate. This and other estimation facts will be discussed in 
the next section. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
In this section local multifractal analysis (LMA) and the crisis 
switching indicator (CSI) based on it are tested for the stock markets 
indexes of three Latin American emerging markets: MERVAL (Argentina), 
IBOVESPA (Brazil) and IGBVL (Peru) around the Mexican crisis. Table 5.1 
shows the data considered for each case divided in two periods. 
For each one of the three indexes 2600 data points were used. 
The pre-crisis period took the first 1100 observations, while the crisis 
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period used the next 1500 ones. Log versions of time series and its returns 
were studied for the crisis period. Typical behavior of financial time series 
such as volatility clustering and fat tails of return’s distribution was found 
for all three series (see figures 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5). One also verified other 
properties that usually are harder to analyze such as log normal volatility, 
absence of returns correlations, and scale variant distribution of returns. 
 
Index Pre-crisis Crisis Period 
MERVAL 10/19/89 - 04/06/94 04/07/94 - 03/31/00 
IBOVESPA 01/02/89 - 07/05/93 07/06/93 - 08/02/99 
IGBVL 01/30/87 - 06/27/91 06/28/91 - 07/01/97 
Table 5.1 Periods of analysis 
 
Due to the lack of homogeneous time intervals, the Mexican crisis 
is manifested at different data points according to the selected time 
series. Table 5.2 summarizes the most important dates and data points 
for all indexes. It shows two periods for the contagious beginning, one for 
MERVAL and IBOVESPA (12/21/94), and other for IGBVL (01/09/95), but 
clearly one highest peak time in 01/10/95. That is a one day reaction 
delay for the contagious of Argentinean and Brazilian markets, and a 
reaction of the Peruvian one almost conditioned to the first two crashes. 
 
Dates Data Points Index 
Contagious Peak Tequila Contagious Peak 
MERVAL 12/21/94 01/10/95 178 179 192 
IBOVESPA 12/21/94 01/10/95 363 364 377 
IGBVL 01/09/95 01/10/95 864 878 879 
Table 5.2: Most important days of the Mexican crisis 
 
4.1. Multifractal Local Analysis of Stock Markets 
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Singularity spectrums (SE) are plotted considering all observations 
for the three indexes in figure 5.6 [5.4 and 5.6]. A first inspection reveals 
that MERVAL and IBOVESPA systems may have similar behavior, with a 
little more frequency of small anomalies in the later case showed by the 
right tail of its parable. On the other hand, the IGBVL case seems to 
have much more entropy signs through smaller and bigger anomalies, 
which are probably caused by its pre-crisis period of rather chaotic 
economic management when compared with the other two indexes. 
Local multifractal analysis (LMA) is made by studying changes 
over time of local singularity spectrums (LSE) for a given time interval. LSE 
are computed in all indexes for the crisis period using rolling windows of 
size 1100, so the first computation in the crisis period is done using all the 
observations of the pre-crisis period. 
A first approach of the potential changes of LSE can be made by 
plotting them in the pre-crisis period and in the complete data set. Figure 
7 shows these computations and suggest a clockwise motion in the three 
cases when the crisis period is added. So apparently, when a crisis 
appears the importance of small anomalies relative to the big ones gain 
more importance for the process. This means that negative moments ( ) 
in equation (11) are becoming more important than positive ones, so 
while the right tail of the parable gets longer, the left one gets shorter. 
 
4.2. Patterns around Stock Market Crashes 
 
In order to establish some homogenous pattern around stock 
market crashes, five basic indicators concerning Holder exponents were 
collected from each LSE in the crisis period: minimum, maximum, mean, 
mode, standard deviation and the one corresponding to the 
information dimension. These calculations are managed in the usual 
way in all cases except for the mean and standard deviation indicators. 
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Following Los and Yalamova [9], in both cases a normalized version is 
computed by weighting the Hölder exponents (H ) by their fractal 
dimension ( ).  )H(f
 
Figures 5.8, 5.9, 5.10, 5.11, 5.12 and 5.13 show trajectories for some 
of the indicators mentioned above, letting one suspects of a jump 
pattern in the minimum series accompanied by an incremental erratic 
behavior of the maximum series. This finding verifies the adequacy of the 
crisis-switching indicator selected, which basically detects sudden 
changes in the minimum path (H ). 
The crisis-switching indicator explained before is tested for the 
three indexes in figures 5.14, 5.15, and 5.16. In all cases moving average 
estimations and bands construction were made considering parameters 
 and  for the crisis period only. CSI empirical results show 
that it only activates for up crossing lines.  
1t1 - 100tt0 -=
As mentioned in the previous section, even though there is a 
crossing line pattern before turbulence periods, it is rather difficult to 
establish a common time delay between the crossing day (the day 
were the CSI is activated), and the crisis or the climax days. Table 3 
summarizes some results concerning CSI estimations. 
 
 
Index Crossing 
Date 
Crossing 
Point 
 
MERVAL 09/05/94 104 
IBOVESPA 09/20/94 302 
IGBVL 01/03/95 874 
Table 5.3: CSI Empirical Results 
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So it seems that for the Mexican crisis of 12/20/94, one could 
actually anticipate the stock market crashes in Argentina (MERVAL), 
Brazil (IBOVESPA) and Peru (IGBVL). In the first two cases about three 
months before it happened, and for the later just a few days in 
advance. Of course this leads to a very important question about the 
optimal waiting time for a crisis to happen after the CSI is activated, with 
a not clear-cut answer. The empirical test of the CSI trough a more 
extend period where dragon and vodka effects are taking into account 
suggest that the maximum waiting time one should consider is 95 data 
points, that is in between three and four months. 
 
Conclusions 
 
It has been showed that patterns in the so-called multifractal path 
of the minimum (H ) apparently existed around the Mexican crisis of 
1994 in the Argentinean (MERVAL), Brazilian (IBOVESPA), and Peruvian 
(IGBVL) markets. It has also been showed that such patterns are 
expressed under the form of sudden changes in the H  trajectory, and 
that such changes can be captured in a formal way by means of a 
crisis-switching indicator with about 60 data points in advance.  
However, there are many tasks to accomplish before being able 
to establish the possibility of turbulence anticipation by means of 
multifractal analysis. For instance, it is not clear why there is not pendular 
movements in IBOVESPA, when they are present in MERVAL and IGBVL. 
The same happens for the need of a more profound analysis of the 
optimal waiting time before a market crash takes effect. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 5.1: Monofractal Model. The figure above shows IGBVL realized 
returns. The one below shows a Gaussian process with the same mean and 
variance as realized IGBVL returns. 
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Figure 5.2: CSI Crossing Lines. Arrows A-B, C-D, D-E and F-G represent up 
(blue) and down (red) crossing lines. Simple discontinuous lines show pendular 
movements of a up-crossing line (blue), or pendular movements of a down-
crossing line (red). Plus lines represent confidence bands. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: MERVAL Natural Logarithm and Returns. The time series are 
plotted for the period: 04/07/94 - 03/31/00.  
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Figure 5.4: IBOVESPA Natural Logarithm and Returns. The time series are 
plotted for the period: 07/05/93 - 07/30/99.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.5: IGBVL Natural Logarithm and Returns. The time series are 
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plotted for the period: 06/28/91 - 07/01/97.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Singularity Spectrums. The graphic on the left shows MERVAL 
and IBOVESPA singularity spectrums (SEs). The one on the right does the same 
for IGBVL. 
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Figure 5.7: Singularity Spectrum Clock Wise Motion. The graphic shows 
MERVAL, IBOVESPA and IGBVL spectrums clock wise motion from a pre-crisis 
period (SE 0) to a post-crisis period (SE 1).  
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Figure 5.8: MERVAL multifractal Paths (a). The graphic shows the 
evolution of the maximum (Max H), minimum (Min H), and information (Inf H) 
Hölder exponents deduced in MLA. The jump in Min H around observation 170 
represents the tequila crisis.  
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Figure 5.9: MERVAL multifractal Paths (b). The graphic shows the 
evolution of the mean (H Mean) and standard deviation (H Std) of Hölder 
exponents deduced in MLA.  
 
 
Figure 5.10: IBOVESPA multifractal Paths (a). The graphic shows the 
evolution of the maximum (Max H), minimum (Min H), and information (Inf H) 
Hölder exponents deduced in MLA. The jump in Min H around observation 300 
represents the tequila crisis.  
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Figure 5.11: IBOVESPA multifractal Paths (b). The graphic shows the 
evolution of the mean (H Mean) and standard deviation (H Std) of Hölder 
exponents deduced in MLA. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.12: IGBVL multifractal Paths (a). The graphic shows the evolution 
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of the maximum (Max H), minimum (Min H), and information (Inf H) Hölder 
exponents deduced in MLA. The jump in Min H around observation 860 
represents the tequila crisis.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.13: IGBVL multifractal Paths (b). The graphic shows the evolution 
of the mean (H Mean) and standard deviation (H Std) of Hölder exponents 
deduced in MLA.  
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Figure 5.14: MERVAL Crisis-Switching Indicator. Both graphics show the 
trajectory of the minimum (Min H) Hölder exponents deduced in MLA limited by 
its bands. A potential crisis may occur around observations that cross these 
bands.  
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Figure 5.15: IBOVESPA Crisis-Switching Indicator. Both graphics show the 
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trajectory of the minimum (Min H) Hölder exponents deduced in MLA limited by 
its bands. A potential crisis may occur around observations that cross these 
bands. 
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Figure 5.16: IBOVESPA Crisis-Switching Indicator. Both graphics show the 
trajectory of the minimum (Min H) Hölder exponents deduced in MLA limited by 
its bands. A potential crisis may occur around observations that cross these 
bands. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FINANCIAL CRISIS OF USA AND THE 
THEORY OF TRANSMISSION. CASE OF 
MEXICO AND ARGENTINA 
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Abstract: Crises models have been one of the most important topics to 
solve nowadays. In financial crises many variables intervene, 
nevertheless, when crises are expected, in other words when it is 
understood what will happen, the effects in other countries won’t be as 
dramatic as to when the crisis is not expected.  In the following paper 
we explain the not expected financial crisis in Mexico in 1994 and the 
impact it had in Argentina, the well known “tequila effect”. We also take 
into account the expected financial crisis that is happening in the 
United States and the effects that is having in the Mexican economy. 
 
Key words: expected financial crisis, not expected financial crisis, 
Mexico, Argentina, United States. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A great number of financial crisis have marked the last phase of the 
twentieth century: the regulation of the currency exchange attacked 
during 1992-1993, the “tequila effect” in 1994-1995, the East Asia crisis in 
1997, the Russian crisis in 1998 and the Brazilian devaluation in 1999. These 
crises have had effects in other countries with different economic 
structures.  
 The Mexican crisis in 1994 was rapidly transmitted to other Latin 
American countries. The crisis that began with a small devaluation of the 
Thai baht in 1997 was split up to other countries especially East of Asia. 
The Russian crisis in 1998 had global implications, affecting many 
emergent as well as developed countries. However, recent crises have 
contained themselves within the national borders. The most notable 
example is the Argentinean crisis in 2001-2002 which had a profound 
impact in Uruguay but not in other countries according to Didier (2006).  
These differences are precisely what incite economists to explain the 
cause of the transmission.  
 The primary objective of the following research paper is to bring an 
additional comparative study and analysis that interprets the effects a 
not expected crisis in Mexico had in Argentina, and the effects it had in 
Mexico an expected crisis in Argentina, in the same way, analyze the 
effects of the present expected crisis in the United States towards 
Mexico. The specific objectives are: 
 To determine the correlational change in the periods of pre-crisis, 
crisis and pos-crisis, in order to analyze the effect of the transmission to 
the three counties studied.  
 To prove if there exists transmission during the Mexican crisis in 1994, 
Argentinean crisis in 2001 and the present 2008 crisis in the United States. 
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The methodology used in this paper is based in the studies on the 
effects of transmission and the econometric analysis based in the model 
by Bakeart et. al (2002) and Lagunes and Watkins (2008). 
 According to Rajan (2007) the not expected financial crisis in 1994 in 
Mexico had repercussions in Latin America in countries like Argentina 
and Brazil, causing one of the worst financial crises of the time. However, 
Mexico did not reflect many problems with the expected crisis in 
Argentina in the beginning of 2001. So, what are the relations and 
correlations that exist between the transmission variables and their 
effects, more or less harmful, of a not expected crisis and the present 
crisis in the United States? Restating the hypothesis as follows: 
“Prove that the effects of expected crises (Argentina 2001 and 
United States 2008) are less than when the crisis is not expected (Mexico 
1994)”. In order to understand how the transmission effect is defined in 
crises we will review the literature, explain the crises cases (Mexico 1994, 
Argentina 2001, United States 2008) and prove the transmission effect in 
case there was correlations and the estimate of systematic risk. 
 
2. Review of literature 
 
One of the most interesting aspects when discussing transmission is 
the disagreement that exists on an exact definition. According to Didier 
(2006), transmission can be defined as the passing on of crises through 
countries implicated by common collisions. In order for such channels to 
work a necessary condition, but not sufficient, is a substantial level of 
international trade and financial integration. The main channels of 
transmission are trade and finances.  
Forbes and Rigobon (2001) divide the explanation of transmission in 
two groups: the theory of contingent crises and the non-contingent 
crises. The theory of contingent crises assumes that the passing on of the 
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mechanisms of transmission change during the crisis, therefore the co-
movements rise after a collision. The theory of non-contingent crises 
assumes that any high crossed correlation in the market after a collision is 
a continuation of the joining that exists before a crisis, and not precisely is 
a transmission.  
The correlation analysis has been widely used in empirical literature of 
transmission. Considering that a significant increase in the correlation of 
the variables of the market analyzed is evidence of transmission, which 
will have to be done after a negative economic or financial event in a 
country or group of countries (Eichengreen et al., 1996; Dornbusch et al., 
2000; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Boschi, M. 2005). In a more restrictive 
approach, Bakeart (2005) points out transmission as an excess of 
correlation, in other words, correlation above all of what is expected. He 
defines transmission as the excess of correlation between markets, given 
by the economical foundations. In order to study transmission, he uses 
the approach of the price of assets, and comments that transmission will 
depend on the perspective of the study, of the given factor in the 
model, and the size of the increase in the correlation will depend on the 
loaded factor. 
In a wide approach, the effect of the transmission will depend on the 
trade ties between regions (Valdez, 2001), (Dornbusch et al 2000) and 
the financial relations (Forbes, 2003), (Soros, 2008).  
 
3. Case studies  
 
3.1 1994 Mexican crisis case (not expected) 
Months before the financial crisis in December 1994, the media and 
schools of economics commented that Mexico presented signs of stable 
recuperation, the only worry was the composition of capital flows, and 
the governmental changes that were near, but due to the growth that 
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was felt, no one noticed, no one expected. This caused that in 
December 1994 Mexico lived one of the worst crises in history. 
 
Main hypothesis on the cause of the Mexican crisis 
For the following analysis we based ourselves in the behavior of the 
main variables implicated in each of the hypothesis that will be 
developed as follows. 
 
3.1.1 The Real Exchange Rate (RER) and the balance of trade  
 The RER between the Mexican peso and the American dollar shows 
how the prices in American goods are compared to the prices of 
Mexican goods. 
In Mexico a semi-fixed exchange rate was used, called “exchange 
fluctuation bands”. This system is called like this because the exchange 
rate fluctuates within a “fluctuation band” that relies with two limits. The 
highest limit is called the band roof, which has a daily and constant slip; 
on the other hand the lowest limit is called the floor, which is constant 
throughout time. 
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Chart 4.1 Represents the exchange rate in Mexico (Exchange 
Fluctuation Bands) 
      
As we see in chart 4.1, the exchange rate is flexible when it fluctuates 
within the exchange fluctuation bands. In general it´s a fixed exchange 
rate because it cannot be superior to the limits which are known to the 
public. In order to maintain these fluctuation bands, the government 
intervenes when the exchange rates touch the limits, selling foreign 
currency or buying it depending on the case. 
With the overvalued hypothesis of the RER the movements in the 
exchange rate have explained all kinds of economic events: crisis in the 
balance of payment, lack of economic momentum, the behavior of 
current account, Krugman (1996) establishes that the cause of the 1994 
crisis has been primarily that the RER was overvalued. 
 With the index of the real exchange rate (IRER), one can see a 
tendency during the period from 1989 to 1994, with a downfall no less 
than 100, this is to say that the exchange rate was overvalued. The RER in 
1989 was 21.85% more overvalued than in 1988, in 1991 was 10.60% more 
overvalued than in 1991, in 1992 its rate was 8.75% more than in 1991 and 
14.67% from 1992 to 1993. The previous caused that less pesos were paid 
for a dollar generating an incentive to imports and discouraging exports. 
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Chart 4.2  Index of RER with consumer prices (year 1990) 
      
In Mexico the real exchange rate was manipulated and controlled in 
order to keep from deteriorating the balance of trade, this caused the 
situation to worsen since the exchange rate with fluctuation exchange 
bands is semi-fixed and requires a great quantity of reserves in order to 
maintain it.  
A deficit in the balance of trade was generated and there was more 
pressure in order to maintain a semi-fixed exchange rate. The 
deterioration of the balance of trade is represented in the series of gross 
exports in chart 4.3. This implies that exports were less than imports. The 
annual growth rate from 1990-1991 was -175.73% and in average the 
annual growth rate was -62.6% 
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Chart 4.3 Balance of the balance of trade (thousands of dollars) 
      
The continuing overvaluation of the RER caused deficits in the 
balance of the balance of trade; this situation was unsustainable, since 
the value of the currency was controlled by monetary authorities and 
finally in December 1994 had to be devaluated. 
 
3.1.2 Capital flows 
According to Calvo and Mendoza (1996), the financial crisis was a 
capital account crisis (CA). The traditional presentation of the capital 
account in the balance of payments, distinguishes the financial 
transactions with the exterior by nature of the financial assets involved 
(short or long term), and the sector of the local economy (public, 
private) that carries them out. The account of the public sector registers 
the transactions of the public sector with the exterior (such as the debt of 
the federal government with banks from the exterior or the buying of 
external assets by public companies). Likewise, the CA of the private 
sector registers the transactions of the private local sector (or national 
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residents, including private companies, and commercial banking) with 
the non residents.  
The share and cash market that comes into effect with the economic 
reforms of the time, experiments a strong growth. The foreign investment 
portfolio (FIP) can be introduced to the share market, and in the cash 
market (buying of stock by non residents), as well as the public sector´s 
cash market (buying of governmental stock). 
From 1989 through 1994, the CA and the FIP maintain the same 
tendency. The previous is an indication of the instability that was living 
Mexico, the FIP is more unstable than the direct and can escape any 
time investors feel panic. 
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Chart 4.4 Capital accounts and liabilities in foreign investment in 
portfolio (thousands of dollars). 
During this period the capital flows were massive and with an 
unequal distribution, which caused a bad distribution of resources 
(between consumption and investment financial and physical assets, 
and between different economic sectors). In table 4.1 we can see the 
growth rate by trimesters in the investment in portfolio. In the fourth 
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trimester of 1990 with regard to the fourth trimester of 1989, the increase 
of cash in the stock market was 586%, previously in 1990-1991 drops 34% 
and recovers in 1993-1994 to a 521.58%. In regard to the cash market, the 
growth rate shows a great increase in the fourth trimester of 1993. 
Total  Total  Stock Market  Cash Market 
IV 1988‐89  ‐40.60%     
IV 1989‐90  216.12%  2.90%   
IV 1990‐91  527.28%  586.77%   
IV 1992‐93  82.18%  34.81%  293.05% 
IV 1993‐94  69.19%  521.58%  73.22% 
IV 1994‐95  ‐159.36%  105.96%  1108.62% 
 
Table 4.1 Growth rate in the total foreign investment portfolio in the 
cash and stock market 
  Investors searched for fast benefits without a long term vision. This 
incorporation of flows was one of the most important causes of the crisis. 
 
3.1.3 Excessive internal credit 
 
In the case of a deficit in the balance of trade, the central bank sells 
its foreign reserves to the public, resulting in a decrease of cash supply. In 
this situation, the central bank in order to sterilize the deficit effects on 
the monetary base, increases internal credit in the same magnitude.  
CBCIR
CBCIRH
Δ=Δ−
=Δ+Δ=Δ 0
 
 
donde, H: Monetary base, IR International Reserves, CBC: Internal 
credit 
The sterilization lets us maintain the base of supply and demand 
without change. The deficit in the balance of cash and sterilization can 
bring adverse consequences, since we need to have a great quantity of 
reserves and bonds in order to maintain the deficit without devaluating. 
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Barro (1996) mentions that the vast expansion of internal credit after 
October 1994 seemed like an attempt to maintain the value of 
government bonds and bank deposits in dollars.  This is, avoid the 
increase in interest rates, as well as the non-fulfillment of the government 
to the banks. By the end of 1994, the central bank balanced the flight of 
capital with a dramatically increase in internal credit and not because 
of a downfall on the monetary base. It is always possible to fix the 
exchange rate if the central bank begins with an excess of reserves over 
the monetary base, and if the bank pays or receives reserves only in 
exchange for the monetary base.  In chart 4.5 we can see that in the 
monetary base there is a negative correlation between credit and 
reserves, due to the use of sterilization by monetary authorities. From 1988 
to the beginning of 1994 is characterized by the flow of capital which 
caused an increase in the international reserves, and a stagnation of the 
monetary base in order to not affect the interest rate. During February 
1994 and January 1995 the continuing deficits in the balance of trade, 
political aspects and the lack of credibility in authorities, caused the 
flight of international reserves in approximately 80%. The central bank in 
order not move the rates, increases internal credit 155%, the previous is 
hard to maintain and the 1994 devaluation is created. 
In an economy where there is a fixed exchange rate and a perfect 
mobility of capital, monetary policy does not work. In other words, 
monetary authorities do not affect interest rates; nevertheless, any 
intention in order to achieve an increase in the income through 
monetary policy will not have effect.  
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Chart 4.5.  Internal credit, monetary base, and international reserves 
 
3.1.4 Risk per country and differences in interest rates 
 
 Ros (1993) in his article “Financial markets and capital flows in 
Mexico”, presents a study on the influence of risk in capital flows. In order 
to analyze the risk per country, Ros (1993) uses two measures: the risk 
measured as the proportion of the interests paid in the debt of exports 
and the second measure, the risk as the difference in the real interest 
rates. Investors analyze these measures in order to measure the risk, 
therefore proving that there is a relation between the capital inflow and 
the risk premium. In chart 4.6 one can observe how the risk per country 
considerably decreased. The proportion of interest to exports dropped 
from 1.70 in 1990 to 1 between 1991 and 1995. 
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Chart 4.6  Interests as proportions to exports 
   One of the main causes of the decrease in interest payments is the 
reduction in external dept. In chart 4.7, one can observe the balance of 
the external debt in thousands of millions of pesos. In order to assess the 
drop in the external debt the monthly growth rate was obtained and the 
annual average was calculated. During 1988 to 1993 was -22.35%, -
9.72%, -17.27%, -17.54%, -11.13% and -6.84% respectively; while the 
internal debt has a growth rate in 1991 of -17%, of -42% in 1992, of -39.4% 
in 1993 and of -26% in 1994. 
 
 
Chart 4.7 Debt in Mexico 
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The previous made the risk per country dropped considerably and 
consequently increased the capital flows of the stock market and the 
cash market, how we observe in the CA hypothesis. The second measure 
to analyze the risk situation in Mexico is the difference in real interest 
rates. In order to calculate the real rate we discounted inflation from the 
nominal rate. Chart 8 illustrates the difference in annual interest rates. 
Historically in Mexico there had been differences in real interest rates that 
fluctuated between 20 to 35%. During Salinas´ presidency this difference 
dropped drastically as follows: in 1991 to 2.72%, in 1992 to 0.87% and 7% 
in 1993 and 1994. 
The signing of the agreement for external debt reduction and the 
negotiations of the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) at 
the beginning of 1009, contributed to the beginning of the decline of the 
differential rates. The ongoing decrease of the differential appears to be 
linked to the decrease of internal and external debt.  
 
 
Chart 4.8  Differences in real interest rates between Mexico and the 
United States. 
      
3.1.5 GNP growth 
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     In chart 4.9 one can observe the evolution of the real Gross 
National Product based in 1993, observing the behavior of the Mexican 
economy. The tendency of the GNP was increasing until before 1995, 
where the GNP went from 1,311,661 millions of pesos in 1994 to 1,230,771 
in 1995. In the chart we observe this downfall, where the economy 
dropped a 6.2% in 1995 with regard to the previous year, this brought 
about the collapse in 1994 which originated the crisis. 
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Chart 4.9  Percentage change in real GNP in Mexico 
 
3.1.6 Political aspects 
 
   Diaz and Cartens (1996) mention that the Mexican crisis has its 
origins in political aspects such as assassinations and the uprising in 
Chiapas. 
     We can say that Mexico suffered three political imbalances during 
1994. The first one being the assassination of the PRI´s (Institutional 
Revolutionary Party) presidential candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio in 
March 1994, and the assassination of Jose Francisco Ruiz, PRI´s secretary 
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general in September 1994. These events originated the flight of reserves 
already mentioned. The second was the uprising in Chiapas that 
generated doubt for foreign investors increasing the risk per country. 
The last imbalance was during the presidential transition. Barro (1994) 
mentions that the identity and the governmental change in January 
1995 were important aspects, that helped to persuade the financial 
markets that the commitment to maintain the exchange rate fixed, was 
not serious. Likewise, he points out that Mr. Aspe (Minister of the Treasury 
with President Salinas) worked hard in order to recover the credibility in 
Mexico, but this faded in December 1994. 
It has been said that the mistake in December was made by the new 
government of President Zedillo whose minister of the treasury had no 
power of persuasion. The new cabinet choose to widen the flotation 
band of the exchange, but this was not an effective measure in order to 
avoid economic imbalance, it wasn’t until a flexible exchange regimen 
was maintained and the devaluation of the currency, when there was a 
stop to the external imbalance and the overvalue of the currency giving 
way to the beginning of the worst crises that Mexico has suffered. 
 
3.3 Crisis in Argentina, 2001 (expected) 
 
During the 20th century, Argentina faced severe crises, but none of 
them as the one at the beginning of the 21st century. The 2001 crisis in 
Argentina was activated essentially by the following elements: the 
vulnerability of the Argentinean economy in the global context of 
recession, the economic policies set forth by Carlos Menem and 
Fernando de la Rua and the role that the IMF plays, leaving structural 
problems that were not resolved. 
 
Main hypothesis on the causes of the crisis in Argentina (expected) 
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For the following analysis we based ourselves in the behavior of the 
main variables implicated in each hypothesis that will be developed 
next. 
 
3.3.1 Fixed exchange rate 
 
     After the continuous appreciation of the American currency 
against those of Argentina´s main trading partners, the Currency Board 
Arrangement (CBA), tied equally the Argentinean peso to the American 
dollar, taking the internal economy in 1999 and 2001 to a significant loss. 
     The CBA lost its credibility, since it did not respond to Argentina´s 
financial needs, the dropping of prices of primary sources in Argentina 
and the flight of capital flows in emergent markets, was a repetitive 
characteristic. According to Armony (2005), the fixed exchange rate 
drove it into a vicious circle of high risk for devaluation and debt, with 
low activity, with overvaluation and increasing debt. As we can clearly 
see in chart 4.10, the behavior of the exchange rate could not be kept 
by the end of 2002, after constant devaluations during all of 2003 were 
shown.  
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Chart 4.10 Exchange rate valuation in 1dollar in Argentina 
 
3.3.2 Price deflation 
According to Cortes (2003), crises appear after an expansion period 
promoted by the increase in public expenditure financed by issuing 
cash, which culminates with high inflation, deficit in the balance of 
payments that required of adjustments given by devaluation followed by 
a recession. However, the 2001 crisis presented in Argentina, on the 
contrary, blew up after many years of recession and with a deflation of 
prices. One can see in chart 4.11, a clear deflation of prices during the 
period being studied continued with a hyperinflation. 
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Chart 4.11.  Inflation in Argentina 
 
3.3.3 Downfall of GNP and tax collection 
    
The downfall of economic activity had a negative effect in tax 
collection. Rua´s administration continued all throughout 2000 and the 
beginning of 2001 failing to attempt the increase of tax collection, 
seeking external support in order to take to long term the overdue debts. 
In March, with the continuous downfall of activity and its consequences 
in collection, the minister of the treasury, Jose Luis Machinea, resigned. In 
the following chart one can see the behavior of the GNP where it  
demonstrates the spectacular downfall of economic activity during the 
period being studied. 
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Chart 4.12 Gross National Product in Argentina 
 
3.3.4 Loans to the IMF  
 
When Argentina began showing signs of economic uneasiness in 
2000, the IMF was blamed since it was a provider and endower of the 
economic policies in Argentina, Cooper  & Momani  (2005). 
In March 2000 Rua´s government signed an agreement with the IMF, 
the Agreement of Payment Moratorium (APM) for 7.2 thousand million 
dollars as a preventive fund to help calm creditors.  
In August 2000 the minister of the treasury, Jose Luis Machinea 
announced that the budget exceeded 10% from the forecasted. 
     Argentina had failed to get enough international credit, 
combined with a regimen of conversion during an era of appreciation 
toward the American dollar, this meant that Argentina was obliged to 
drain its monetary reserves and would touch bottom in November 22, 
2000. 
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Argentina asked IMF for another loan under the Agreement of 
Payment Moratorium for 13.7 billion dollars. Some months later, the 
executive council of the IMF approved the petition of increasing the 
funding of the agreement of payment moratorium of 2000. Argentina 
would have omitted its external loans without a massive rescue package 
negotiated with the IMF. 
 
3.3.5 The playpen (corralito) 
 
In December 2001, the IMF does not rescue Argentina by not 
approving their demand for refinancing their debt. The government 
without credit begins to be unable to maintain its international debts. 
Banks try to maintain the situation, turning the debt from short term 
for long term. In December, with the evidence that the banking system 
had in its assets state bonds hard to collect, a urgent flight of deposits 
from the banks begun, that Cavallo stopped preventing cash 
withdrawals (playpen), and not turning them into American dollars, just 
Argentinean currency. This provoked the Argentineans (that could only 
withdraw their deposits with debit cards) to do public demonstrations 
(cacerolazos) that concluded with an uprising in the “Plaza Mayo” (main 
square) that  demanded the resignation of the president under the 
threat of a political trial. This is how in the middle of a crisis, De la Rua´s 
presidency concluded.  
 
3.3.6 Corruption 
 
According to Armony et al. (2005), a great quantity of economists, 
politicians and experts explain that the financial crisis of 2001 in 
Argentina is described by macroeconomic adverse factors mainly by 
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the corruption of public officials that has had a harmful tendency, has 
designed the wrong policy and institutional malfunction. 
 
3.4 Crisis in the United States (expected) 
 
The United States is in the middle of a financial crisis that was not seen 
since the Great Depression of the 1930´s. The present crisis is not 
comparable with the periodical crises that have affected particular 
segments of the financial system since the 1980´s, even though this crisis 
has put the entire system on the verge of bankruptcy.  
According to Soros (2008), there are two booms to consider: the 
property and the long term commodities boom. In particular, the present 
situation cannot be understood without taking into account China´s, 
India´s and some oil producing countries with economic force, in order 
to explain the commodities boom, a system with an exchange rate that 
is part floating an part tied to the American dollar and part to other 
currency; and the decreasing disposition of the rest of the world to retain 
American dollars.  
As a result of the Technological crisis that exploded in 2000, as well as 
the terrorists’ attacks of September 11, the United States Federal Reserve 
dropped the referential rate to one percent and it was maintained until 
June 2004, which led to a property boom. Something similar happened 
in other countries; however the size and importance of the United States 
in the financial market kept all eyes in this. Moreover, the United States 
mortgage funds have been completely distributed around the world to 
some institutional European keepers, mainly German, which became 
more involved than the Americans. 
The conventional method of assets security analysis does not pertain. 
Investment analysts try to predict the process of future profits and from 
there estimate the price that investors are willing to pay for these profits; 
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however, this method is inappropriate for mortgage since the price that 
investors are willing to pay for the stocks is an important factor in order to 
determine the future of profits. Instead of predicting the future of profits 
and the future of valuations separately, one should try to predict the 
process complete. 
It can be concluded that the inadequate analysis and inefficient 
surveillance, produced an important dropped in the quality of property 
funds.  
 
2. Methodology 
 
This paper defines transmission as a significant increase in the 
correlation (that can be positive or negative) between the economic 
and/or financial variables of two or more countries, induced by an 
external shock (Edwards and Susmel, 1999). In order to prove the 
previous we obtained the descriptive statistics of the effects of the crisis 
in Mexico (1994) on Argentina, as well as the impact of Argentina and 
Mexico in 2001 and last, the effects of the US economy since 2007 on 
these Latin American countries.  
In order to be more restrictive on the hypothesis of transmission, we 
applied the Bakeart et. al (2202) model also used by Lagunes and 
Watkins (2008) in order to analyze the crisis in Mexico, a not expected 
crisis, and its effects in Argentina, as well as the crisis in Argentina in 2001, 
considered as expected, affected Mexico, as well as the transmission (if 
there is one) that the United States economy is causing in Mexico and 
Argentina.  
  For each of the three countries studied, we selected the most 
representative stock exchange indexes, for Mexico the index of the 
“Indice de Precios y Cotizaciones” (IPC), in Argentina its counterpart 
would be MERVAL and in the United States the SP500. The estimates are 
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daily and the prices being studied vary depending on the periods of the 
crisis, pre-crisis and post-crisis; for which we calculated the logarithmic 
differences of the indexes of value of each country. 
 
4.1 Econometric model 
 
In order to prove if there is evidence of transmission we applied the 
Bakeart et al. (2002) with a modified version of Lagunes and Watkins 
(2008). The initial model is as follows: 
tbtatbbtb eRR ,,,1, ++=+ βα    (1) 
110, Dtb βββ +=  (2) 
     Where: 
      tbR , = Stockholders return index of the country being transmitted.  
     bα  = Constant term, independent from the behavior of the other 
stockholders markets. 
     = taR , Stockholders return index of the country that originates the 
crisis. 
      = tbe , Term for random error. 
    tb,β = The coefficient that indicates the relationship between the 
share return of the country that originates the transmission with the share 
return of the country being transmitted.  
As we can see in equation (1), the coefficient tb,β  can be broken up 
in two parts: 0β is used to estimate the relationship of the share return of 
the two countries in stable periods, and 11Dβ indicates this relationship 
during the periods in which the country that originates the transmission is 
in crisis. Variable  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when 
the country that initiates the transmission is in crisis and takes the value of 
0 when the country that originates the crisis is not in this period. 
1D
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Below you will see the periods that we will use for each of the crises 
detected. 
 The 1994 Mexican crisis, known as the “tequila effect” was not 
expected. Period: Pre-crisis January 3, 1992 through December 19, 1994, 
crisis December 20, 1994 through December 20, 1995, Post-crisis 
December 12, 1995 through December 21, 1997, model to estimate: 
tbtIPCtbbtMER eRR ,,,1, ++=+ βα
tbtIPCcrisismextIPCbtMER eRDRR ,,1,01,   +++=+ ββα  
 The 2001 Argentinean crisis, known as the “financial playpen” 
which was expected. Period: Pre-crisis October 28, 1999 through October 
28, 2001, crisis October 29, 2001 through August 30, 2002, Post-crisis 
September 1, 2002 through September 1, 2004. 
tbtMERtbbtIPC eRR ,,,1, ++=+ βα  
tbtMERcrisistMERbtIPC eRDRR ,,arg1,01,   +++=+ ββα  
 
 The United States crisis known as the “supreme crisis”. Pre-crisis, 
January 7, 2003 through July 8, 2007, crisis June 8, 2007 through June 8, 
2008. 
 
tbtSPtbbtIPC eRR ,,500,1, ++=+ βα  
tbtSPcrisisaeutSPbtIPC eRDRR ,,5001,50001,   +++=+ ββα  
 
 
4.2 Hypothesis  
     The capital markets are related. In order to prove this assumption 
we state our first hypothesis: “exist a relation between stock yield indexes 
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from the country that presented the crisis and does subject to 
transmission”  
H1: tb,β ≠ 0. 
If the transmission exists between the crisis periods it should be 
stronger than the relation without crisis which leads to our next 
assumption that consists in proving that: “the relation between the stock 
yield indexes is different in calm periods and in crisis periods, this is, we 
hope that the correlation in crisis periods increases, which indicates 
transmission: 
H2: │ 1β │ >│ 0β │; │ 1β │ ≠ 0 
If the coefficient β1 has negative sign it shows the inverse relation 
indicating that the infected country experiments a positive effect 
caused by the crisis in the country that started the contagion. If β1 is 
positive and significant, then a direct correlation exists between the 
markets, which demonstrate a negative transmission; the subject to 
transmission gets affected in an adverse way by the country that 
originates the crisis.  
 
4.3 Model Estimation 
Model estimation is done in two stages like Lagunes and Watkins 
(2008). In first place, the obtain the relation between markets (βb,t) from 
equation estimation(1) explained in the methodology 
( tbtatbbtb eRR ,,,1, ++=+ βα )  using the minimum square ordinate method due 
to heterocedasticity and auto-correlation presence, we repeat the 
model estimation through the Newey-West correction method. This 
process repeats for three cases. In second place, the equation (2) 
110, Dtb βββ += is included in the equation 
(1) tbtatbbtb eRR ,,,1, ++=+ βα obtaining the following: 
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tbtatabtb eDRRR ,,1,01,   +++=+ ββα  will help to prove contagion existence. 
Si  │ 1β │ >│ 0β │; │ 1β │ ≠ 0. 
 
4.4  Applications 
A) Mexico’s Case 
If we analyze the descriptive statistics we can observe the change in 
average and standard deviation as well as the coefficient behaviors of 
correlation. If the observe a significant increase in the variables 
correlation of the analyzed markets, which will result after a negative 
economic or financial event occurs in a country or group of countries 
(Eichengreen et al., 1996; Dornbusch et al., 2000; Forbes y Rigbon, 2002) 
we state a contagion existence. 
The table above shows that the average return in Argentina was 
affected in 74% decrease and increate in volatility in the crisis period, 
meanwhile United States market had an increase of more than 600% 
with a decrease to volatility. The previous facts show that Mexican 
economy infected Argentina in a negative way and United States 
economy in a positive way. 
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Precrisis 
3/01/1992-
19/12/1994
Crisis 
20/12/1994-
20/12/1995
Postcrisis 
21/12/1995-
21/12/1997
Mean -0.06% -0.02% 0.05%
Estandar Desviation 2.66% 3.16% 1.85%
Range 22.86% 22.16% 20.67%
Minimun -12.71% -10.09% -14.76%
Maximun 10.15% 12.07% 5.90%
Mean 0.05% 0.09% 0.13%
Estandar Desviation 1.62% 2.40% 1.56%
Range 12.79% 18.41% 25.37%
Minimun -6.53% -8.63% -14.31%
Maximun 6.26% 9.78% 11.06%
Mean 0.02% 0.12% 0.10%
Estandar Desviation 0.61% 0.50% 1.01%
Range 4.75% 3.42% 12.10%
Minimun -2.43% -1.56% -7.11%
Maximun 2.32% 1.86% 4.99%
Argentina
Mexico
United States
 
Table 4.2. Behavior of daily stock returns for Argentina, Mexico and 
United States on the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods in México 1994 
In the previous graphic we can observe that in the crisis period 
between Mexico and Argentina in which exist an increase in correlations 
of almost 250% meanwhile in Mexico and Unites States a small increase 
of 20%, this indicates that Mexico affected considerably to Argentinean 
economy, which may cause transmission.  
 
Precrisis 
3/01/1992-
19/12/1994
Crisis 
20/12/1994-
20/12/1995
Postcrisis 
21/12/1995-
21/12/1997
Mexico-
Argentina 12.97% 45.32% 58.99%
Mexico-
United 
States 24.95% 30.17% 60.74%
Argentina-
United 
States 12.64% 17.86% 59.54%  
Table 4.3 Coefficients of correlation of the shareholding yields of 
Argentina, Mexico and the United States in the periods of pre-crisis, crisis 
and post-crisis of Mexico in 1994 
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If we apply Bekaert’s Model et al. (2002) with a modified version of 
Lagunes and Watkins (2008) and supposing a series of cases to observe 
the effects of delay transmission.  
coeficient 0.4627 0.4009 0.1953
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.1374
R2 0.1039
coeficient 0.2109 0.1336 0.2442
p-value 0.0000 0.0264 0.0295
R2 0.0216
coeficient -0.0070 0.0213 -0.0893
p-value 0.8839 0.7238 0.3958
R2 0.0000
coeficient 0.0720 0.1300 -0.1833
p-value 0.2494 0.0376 0.1980
R2 0.0025
0
1
2
3
0.1079
0.0278
-0.0001
0.0060
tb ,β 0β 1β
 
Table 4.4 Econometric model results for contagion in Argentina in 
pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods for Mexico.  
 
Estimating the first equation to prove the hypothesis H1: tb,β ≠ 0 we 
prove that for zero cases the coefficient is statistically different from zero, 
due to the fact that in │ 1β │ = 0 there is no presence of transmission. 
When we estimate the model supposing two cases we observe 1β │ 
>│ 0β │; │ 1β │ ≠ 0 by which we suppose Mexico and Argentina’s crisis in 
1994 contagion, we contrast the previous statement with Wald Test 
which is useful to analyze how well the estimated coefficients in a 
regression without restrictions satisfy the stated hypothesis restrictions. We 
observed that the null hypothesis is not considered, which implies the 
existence of transmission from Mexico to the Argentinean economy.  
The crisis of the Mexican economy in the end of the year 1994 was 
the trigger for the crisis of confidence in Argentina, Carrizosa et Al. 
(1996). In fact, according to what was suggested by “the wake-up call 
hypothesis”, a crisis in a country may encourage another crisis in another 
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country or countries. Countries seen with weak fundaments that increase 
their risk aversion and which are translated in increments in the loan rates 
Agénor, P., Aizenman, J. & Hoffmaister, A. (2008) 
 
B) Argentina´s Case 
Precrisis 
10/28/1999-
10/28/2001
Periodo de
Cris is 
10/29/2001-
08/30/2002
Periodo de
Postcrisis 
09/01/2002-
09/01/2004
Mean -0.19% 0.24% 0.36%
Estandar Desviation 2.29% 3.94% 1.93%
Range 16.92% 27.41% 15.99%
Minimun -9.07% -11.29% -9.02%
Maximun 7.84% 16.12% 6.97%
Mean 0.02% 0.05% 0.12%
Estandar Desviation 2.01% 1.43% 1.09%
Range 16.68% 8.29% 9.22%
Minimun -9.66% -4.52% -5.44%
Maximun 7.02% 3.78% 3.78%
Mean -0.04% -0.10% 0.06%
Estandar Desviation 1.42% 1.68% 1.30%
Range 10.88% 11.53% 9.58%
Minimun -5.99% -5.96% -4.24%
Maximun 4.89% 5.57% 5.34%
Argentina
Mexico
United 
States
 
Table 4.4 Behavior of daily stock returns for Argentina, Mexico and 
United States on the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods in Argentina 
2001. 
 
A different behavior can be observed on the positive average from 
the stock market during the crisis in Argentina. This can be a 
consequence of the imposed restrictions by the Argentinean monetary 
authorities, which discourage investment funds and leave stock market 
as the only viable option of investment which may become liquid.  
The mean and standard deviation from Mexico in pre-crisis and post-
crisis experience almost no change, which can be conclusively assumed 
that the Argentinean crisis did not alter this market behavior after the 
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crisis, it shows a recover for the three markets as well as a reduction on 
volatility. This could be a consequence of the eliminating of the 
restrictions on the availability of cash imposed during the crisis period. 
This can be interpreted as a rising behavior once the recession on the 
United States is over. 
On the other hand, the correlations show that the Argentinean crisis 
did not affect Mexico’s or the United States’ economy, for which there is 
no evidence of transmission.  
 
Precrisis 
10/28/99-
10/27/01
Crisis 
10/29/01-
08/30/02
Post crisis
09/01/02-
09/01/04
Mexico-
Argentina 56.51% 9.48% 24.18%
Mexico-
United 
States 61.85% 65.74% 64.40%
Argentina-
United 
States 49.91% 6.38% 20.52%  
Table 4.5 Correlation coefficients of stock returns from 
Argentina, Mexico, and the United States during pre-crisis, 
crisis and post-crisis from Argentina in 2001. 
 
coeficient 0.1748 0.2703 -0.2385
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R2 0.0824
coeficient 0.022668 0.038697 -0.04
p-value 0.2409 0.101 0.3349
R2 0.001389
coeficient 0.00842 0.00834 0.0002
p-value 0.6151 0.7262 0.995
R2 0.000192
coeficient 0.014973 0.02889 -0.0347
p-value 0.4003 0.1945 0.2899
R2 0.000613
2
0.002428
1
0.0002
3
0.0014
0
0.1193
tb ,β 0β 1β
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Table 4.6. Econometric model results of transmission for the pre-
crisis, crisis and post-crisis in Argentina 2001. 
 
By estimating the first equation we prove that Argentinean economy 
affects Mexican economy because tb,β ≠ 0 (which is shown at p-value) 
from the equation with zero cases.  
If we estimate the model with the variable dummy 
tbtatabtb eDRRR ,,1,01,   +++=+ ββα to observe the transmission it results that, 
Argentina infected Mexico positively because in │ 0β │ >│ 1β │ there is no 
transmission presence according to the restrictive Bekaert’s et al. (2002) 
model. 
 
C) United States Case 
United States crisis which has its start in 2007 according to Soros (2008) 
is having adverse effects in Mexican and Argentinean economies. In the 
graphic we observe that the half of the average returns has decreased 
in both economies in more than 85% meanwhile in the volatility there is 
no significant change. By the other hand, United States economy 
experienced fall downs in their return for more than 185% with a 
considerable increase in its volatility. Given the statistics above it shows a 
possible transmission of the United States economy to the studied 
countries. 
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Precrisis 
01/07/2003-
07/08/2007
Periodo de
Crisis 
06/08/2007- 
06/08/2008
Mean 0.10% 0.01%
Estandar Desviation 1.69% 1.48%
Range 14.82% 10.38%
Minimun -8.74% -5.31%
Maximun 6.09% 5.07%
Mean 0.15% 0.02%
Estandar Desviation 1.17% 1.49%
Range 12.49% 9.04%
Minimun -5.98% -4.67%
Maximun 6.51% 4.37%
Mean 0.04% -0.04%
Estandar Desviation 0.72% 1.34%
Range 5.92% 8.42%
Minimun -3.53% -4.30%
Maximun 2.39% 4.12%
Mexico
Argentina
United 
States
 
Table 4.7. Daily Stock yield behaviors for Argentina, Mexico and 
United States during pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods in United States 
2007. 
 
The relation in correlations from the graphic above we observe an 
increase in correlations between indexes in stock market for each 
country, which apparently shows a contagion in United States economy.   
Precrisis 
07/01/2003-
08/07/2007
Cris is 
08/06/2007-
03/06/2008
Mexico-
Argentina 40.90% 54.16%
Mexico-
United 
States 60.64% 80.11%
Argentina-
United 
States 36.83% 47.87%  
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Table 4.8. Correlation coefficients of Argentina, Mexico and United 
Stated stock yield, during Unites States pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis 
periods in 1994. 
 
To prove the existence of transmission in its most restrictive way we 
estimate the regressions (1) and (2) presented in the methodology.  
coeficient 0.6545 0.3676 0.5237
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R2 0.5244
coeficient -0.0627 0.0019 -0.1181
p-value 0.0109 0.9582 0.0172
R2 0.0041
coeficient -0.0680 0.0067 -0.1360
p-value 0.0057 0.8558 0.0061
R2 0.0049
coeficient 0.0741 0.0063 0.1233
p-value 0.0026 0.8635 0.0128
R2 0.0060
3
0.0113
0
0.6064
1
0.0075
2
0.0097
tb ,β 0β 1β
 
Table 4.9 Econometric transmission model results for Mexico during 
United States pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods.  
 
We observe in the graphic above that the United States value index 
affects Mexico from 0 to 3 cases, but due to │ 0β │ <│ 1β │y a que │ 1β │≠ 0  
the existence of transmission from United States to Mexico is immediate. 
This is congruent with the findings observed in the correlations and 
descriptive statistics.  
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coeficient 0.4709 0.3041 0.3233
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R2 0.4939
coeficient -0.0997 -0.0231 -0.1814
p-value 0.0000 0.3245 0.0000
R2 0.0200
coeficient 0.0093 -0.0079 0.0410
p-value 0.6050 0.7390 0.2649
R2 -0.0005
coeficient 0.0450 0.0240 0.0498
p-value 0.0133 0.3137 0.1765
R2 0.0035
3
0.0040
0
0.5517
1
0.0359
2
-0.0003
tb,β 0β 1β
 
Table 4.10. Econometric model results for contagion in Argentina in 
pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods for United States crisis.  
 
Analyzing the descriptive statistics and correlations between 
Argentinean and United States economies we find transmission 
indicators, (this can be proved by │ 1β │ =0 y │ 0β │ <│ 1β │which assumes 
transmission in immediate form from United States to Argentina). 
 
 
Conclusions 
If we consider that the significant increase in the variables correlation 
of the market analyzed is evidence of transmission, (Eichengreen et al. 
1996; Dornbusch et al. 2000; Forbes and Rigbon, 2002; Boschi, M. (2005). 
In Mexico’s crisis 1994 exist an increase in correlations in IPC and MER 
returns for 250%, which assumes transmission; this is called the tequila 
effect. By the other hand, under the Bekaert’s Model (2005) exists the 
effect of contagion for one case.  
We can not get conclusions about the effect that Argentina had 
over Mexican economy in year 2001 due to the lack of significant 
changes in the correlations, however if we apply Bekaert’s model (2005) 
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we observe that exist a positive effect between Argentinean return 
indexes over Mexico, even though there is no evidence of transmission in 
crisis period. 
To conclude, we can observe that even though under the co-
relational focus United States economy is affecting in a significant way to 
Argentinean and Mexican economy and our hypothesis are proved 
under the econometric model in which there is instant transmission on 
behalf of the United States.  
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CHAPTER 5 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM REGULATION: 
STABILITY VERSUS INSTABILITY 
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS 
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*University of Cantabria, **University of Barcelona 
 
Abstract: Financial regulation and Globalization are key elements 
in Financial System stability or instability. Focusing the analysis in financial 
crisis regulation and Globalization, stability will be reached when 
frequency and magnitude of crises be reduced (regulation for control of 
financial risks and fluctuations, and for supervision of globalization of 
information and capital movements by authorities), and instability will be 
translated in the contagion of all system of a crisis or in the system 
fragility by a crisis (regulation failure in defense of Financial System by 
authorities).   
Some preventive politics as financial regulation or prudential 
supervision are required for the sake of maintaining a stable 
macroeconomic environment and avoiding inefficient agents, that 
contribute to system fragility. The aim of this paper is to show an analysis 
of the theoretical justification and effects on financial stability of 
regulations proposals of Financial System, which are affected by 
Globalization, and related with International Financial Institutions 
recommendations and with the impact of international taxation on 
capital movement.   
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1. Introduction 
From 1990s until now frequency and importance of financial crises 
have increased, which have affected to so much Emerging Economies 
(Latin America and Southeast Asian) as Europe and United States of 
America: European Monetary System, Mexico, Thailand, Korea, 
Indonesian, Russia, LTCM, Argentina, Brazil, technological bubble and 
dot.com..., with different causes and consequences. Every financial 
crisis supposes a deterioration of (i) system credibility, (ii) credit solvency 
and/or (iii) productive economy. By these facts, it is desirable financial 
stability. 
Financial notion of stability remits to the idea of a Financial System 
without abrupt neither continuous fluctuations, above all unfavourable 
in form of losses. In practice, it supposes a control of financial risk so that 
unfavourable contingency, when occurs, does not surpass expected 
losses and affects to solvency and credibility of Financial System, and by 
extension to Real Economy. They are required, therefore, some 
preventive politics as financial regulation or prudential supervision for the 
sake of maintaining a stable macroeconomic environment and 
avoiding inefficient agents, that contribute to system fragility.   
Public regulation implies that in crisis epochs, if it is seen like 
insufficient, large and generalized losses could be produced by moral 
hazard, adverse selection, loss of market credibility, speculation… And 
these losses are quickly diffused by feedback to all Financial System 
because of the Globalisation of financial products and contracts, by 
transnationality of economic agents, and by information in real time. 
Financial System since the second half of XIX Century are similar to 
information markets (Eichengreen, 2003), because of 
telecommunications development. It permits, by greater security and 
velocity, the boom of capital transfers, and design and sophistication of 
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financial operations. All these elements imply that Globalisation was not 
born simply by International Trade growth, but also was joined to birth 
and expansion of International Financial System. 
Globalisation can have evil effects in Financial System by 
information diffusion, which generates contagion effects and herding 
behaviour among economic agents (Bikhchandani, 2000). These 
elements magnify market fluctuations, deriving in financial bubbles and 
crises. Financial regulation tries to limit this Globalisation influence, thanks 
to more quality of diffused information and to prevention of fraudulent 
behaviour. This control generates, at the same time, the subsistence of 
inefficiencies, because of arbitrage is nor cheap neither quick. Then, 
there is a trade-off between financial regulation, that tries to reduce 
frequency and importance of financial crises, and market efficiency, 
that tries to take advantage of inefficiencies and of regulation failures.     
Therefore, financial regulation and Globalisation are key elements 
in Financial System stability or instability. Focusing the analysis in financial 
crisis regulation and Globalisation, stability will be reached when 
frequency and magnitude of crises be reduced (regulation for control of 
financial risks and fluctuations, and for supervision of globalisation of 
information and capital movements by authorities), and instability will be 
translated in the contagion of all system of a crisis or in the system 
fragility by a crisis (regulation failure in defence of Financial System by 
authorities).   
A financial crisis implies losses above confidence threshold of 
unexpected losses. This crisis passes to be global if rational or irrational 
contagion effects are derived on other sectors and/or on other 
economies. This phenomenon is called “systemic risk” (De Bandt, 2000). 
It is supposed in the bases of international regulation of Financial System 
to avoid, in the measure of the possible, “irrational” contagion and to 
reduce the magnitude of “rational” contagion. This regulation is formed 
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by implementation of agreements and recommendations of sovereign 
States, of different forums, as Basel II, or fiscal policies coordination, that 
they tax capital movement.   
The aim of this paper is to show an analysis of regulations 
proposals of Financial System, which are affected by Globalisation, and 
related with International Financial Institutions recommendations and 
with the impact of international taxation on capital movement. In this 
way, we present a study divided in four parts of financial regulation, its 
causes and its consequences in stability and instability of Financial 
System, supported strategically by Game Theory. After this introduction 
to financial stability and to risks of its instability, we analyse the 
corresponding international Regulation, to put an end with a study of 
Strategic Fundaments of the resistance of regulatory measures, followed 
by Conclusions.   
 
2. Financial system regulation 
 
Financial System regulation is run to desirable system stability with 
its peculiar and continuous fluctuations. That is to say, regulation has a 
preventive origin under a regulatory form, but with an intention to be 
neutral over market or over financial behaviour.  
In this way, national and international regulation, that flows of 
different normative, as Basel II, agreements of capital movement 
taxation, “permitted” fluctuation bands, fraud persecution…, pretends 
to avoid and to reduce economic and social problems of stability and 
credibility losses of Financial System. Because price of Financial System 
control are high and there are international coordination problems, we 
consider like financial aim of regulation: to reduce frequency and 
extension of financial crises. Regulation tries, by means of information 
and risk management supervision, and of market security control, to limit 
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contagion effect produced by Globalisation and information distortion, 
as rumours, accounting reliability, etc, and by destabilizing fluctuations.   
In our strategic analysis of financial regulation, we distinguish 
between regulation that affects to capital movements, and regulation 
that affects to Financial System fragility, by an excess of risk in financial 
positions and decisions.   
 
2.1 International Taxation 
 
In the present globalised framework a greater free capital 
movements, together with the apparition of new financial products, has 
done that in recent years different tax reforms of capital earnings have 
been produced at international level with the objective of disincentiving 
national capital transfers to foreign economies and the consequent 
pernicious effect for national economy. According to Bacchetta and 
Caminal (Bacchetta, 1991), “a greater mobility of capital permits 
investors to choose with more facility the country of the most favourable 
fiscal processing and, consequently, political tax decisions of each 
economy are influenced by the decisions taken by the other 
economies. This interdependency introduces a strategic element in tax 
politics of different governments, given the existence of important 
incentives to compete for capital, cutting off tax levels. Some European 
economies are conscious of the negative consequences of this 
competitive behaviour and tried to prompt a process of negotiations in 
order to coordinate or to harmonize taxes, although so far without 
complete success”.  In this sense, “Tobin Rate” appears in this debate as 
some autonomous financial measures for national authorities, that puts 
tax international monetary speculation and the existence of tax 
paradises by its possible evil effects on national economies.  
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The optimum model of tax politics in terms of efficiency and 
equity, in an international context of mobility of capital, requires to 
establish (i) some basic principles of international tax assignment in 
direct taxation, (ii) the definition of coordination mechanisms that avoid 
double international imposition and (iii) the establishment so much of tax 
neutrality criteria (efficiency) (Frenkel, 1990) in international allocation of 
capital as of equity among agents and nations (Álvarez, 2003).   
As summary Table 2.1 collects different criteria of efficiency in 
international taxation of capital movement, the pursued aims and 
conditions and instruments for its practice. Logically, this scheme should 
complement with addition of basic principles of equity among 
individuals (vertical and horizontal equity) and among nations (fair 
distribution among different countries of taxable income generated in 
international transactions among them, for which it is necessary an 
harmonization in fiscal relations).   
 
EFFICIENCY OBJECTIVES INSTRUMENTS 
Neutrality of 
International efficiency 
on world capital export 
allocation 
 
Efficiency on investment allocation 
Equal tax with independence of source 
of income 
Tax system based 
on residency and 
exemption-at-
source as the 
general method 
Full Fiscal Credit 
Neutrality of National  
efficiency on world 
capital export 
allocation 
To avoid exit capitals. Equal National tax: 
it equals full profitability marginal of 
national investment with marginal 
profitability of net external investment 
Deduction in tax 
base of 
international tax 
Neutrality of 
International  efficiency 
on world capital import 
allocation 
 
Efficient distribution of saving. It equals 
profitability of investments in the country 
for residents and not residents. Equity on 
Distribution of tax base of bilateral 
transactions. To burden residents' 
Tax system based 
on source and 
exemption-at-
residency as the 
general method  
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 income without discriminations; not to 
discriminate against among income 
obtained by non residents 
Fiscal 
Coordination. 
Table 2.1 Direct Taxation and International Coordination. Source: 
Álvarez, 2003; Cordón, 2001; Albi, 2000; Zubirí, 1987; and Zubirí,1997 
The paralysis of fiscal process of harmonization in environment of 
direct taxes, especially in the case of the European Union, is doing that 
a generalised discount be produced of capital taxation, because 
measures that seek to attract capital of other jurisdictions are adopted 
for different economies and to avoid national capital exits. Nevertheless, 
according to Zubirí (Zubirí, 2001) and Álvarez, Alonso, Gago and 
González (Álvarez, 2001) there are so much economic arguments exist 
(improve in the conditions for creation of employment and impulse of 
economic growth) as politic (displacement of income of medium voter 
or perception by society of an excessive fiscal pressure, and preference 
by tax reduction against increase in public expense) to justify lower 
taxes.   
 
2.2 Financial Risk Control According to Basel II 
 
From Bretton Woods International Financial System regulation 
showed a qualitative change with created institutions of International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank, which lost part of its effectiveness after 
the fall of Gold Standard. Afterwards, the first stages of Basel Committee 
of Banking Supervision have appeared, associated to Bank for 
International Settlements. With this basis, the first Agreement on Capital 
Minimums of Basel I is approved in 1988. This agreement was ineffective 
in avoiding financial crises of 1990s and beginnings of XXI Century: 
European Monetary System crisis, Mexican crisis, bankruptcy of Bank 
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Barings, Asian crisis, Russian crisis, bankruptcy of LTCM hedge fund, 
technological bubble, Brazil and Argentina crises… 
To avoid in the measure of possible or to reduce frequency of 
these crises, in 1998 initiatives for a New Basel Capital Accord, called 
Basel II, have began. Basel II concentrates on financial regulation of 
market risk, credit risk and operational risk. 
Basel I defended a risk measurement and control according to a 
risk typology in function of the counterpart, that was ineffective in the 
successive financial crises of 1990s, due to that, on one hand, each 
country and each business have a different risk, although they belong to 
similar groups, and, on the other hand, each operation supposes a 
different risk by its characteristics and by the counterpart’s experience. 
Basel II introduces these aspects by means of internal 
measurements of risk through a risk typology according to the operation, 
the counterparts and the stratification of default rates according to 
historic statistics. Also, is supposes a risk management based on ratings 
and benchmarking and a supervision that verify the internal systems 
quality of financial risk measurements and managements, requiring a 
minimum of eight per cent of risk exposition as capital to guarantee 
company solvency.   
Basel II in 2005 will try to adapt, in greater measure that in past, 
capital requirements by credit and operational risks, reducing the 
distance between required regulatory capital and necessary economic 
capital. In this way, banking supervision is improved in front of 
Globalisation, internationalisation, sophistication and competence in 
financial sector in order to contribute to Financial System stability. For 
these aims Basel II has three pillars: The first pillar affects to Financial 
System regulation because it collects recommendations for minimum 
capital requirements (credit, market and operational risks) and because 
it defends a minimum solvency coefficient. The second pillar treats 
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about the revision of supervisor, monitoring and its evaluating function of 
solvency, and about the quality checking of risk measurement and 
management systems so that they adapt to regulation that derives from 
the first pillar. The third and last pillar refers to market discipline as 
financial mechanism of efficiency, because it incentives efforts to 
promote Financial System solvency and security through a greater 
information transparency. In this way, Basel II intends to contribute, not 
only to Financial System stability, but also to a competitive equality that 
prevents bad practices and system fragility, that is to say, prevents big 
financial fluctuations and crises.   
In concrete, Basel II fights for an internal model for default 
probabilities calculations or estimations, that is able to be sophisticated 
by internal estimation of recovery degree of investment in case of 
default, and of risk exposed value.   
The formula of regulatory capital calculation purposes by Basel II 
does not limit use of advanced risk measurement techniques through risk 
exposition estimation, as methodologies of VaR, Conditional VaR 
(catastrophic loss), Extreme Values, Copulas, etc, by means of sensibility 
analysis, case generation  or simulation.   
But this apparent flexibility has its constraints above all in which 
affects to financial stability, as contagion risk possibility by it 
procyclicality of Basel II regulation (Borio, 2001).   
 
3. Strategic Fundaments of Financial Regulation 
 
Financial crises are related at macro level with instability of economic 
nominal fundamentals, as exchange rate, inflation or interest rate. At 
microeconomic level, crises are associated to local episodes of banking 
bankruptcies. In this section we will consider the study of financial crises 
at macro level, because at this level they have a greater influence in 
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Financial System fluctuations and it is observed a greater international 
coordination for its prevention, so much in capital movement control as 
in risk management and measurement supervision. It does not mean, 
nevertheless, that banking regulation is not affected by general financial 
regulation, because microeconomic financial crises can have 
international effects if they are transferred to all the economy and 
afterwards they pass to rest of the Financial System. In the study of 
banking crises can be considered a herding behaviour that weaken 
national credit sector and it is infected to exterior “irrationally” by a 
confidence loss in nearby countries or economies of the same block. 
Contagion effects are divided into “rational” and “irrational”. The first 
appear when contagion effects respond to factors of Real Economy, 
being consequence of the variation of Fundamentals through the fall of 
international commerce by financial crises, by business losses transferred 
to headquarters or by devalued position liquidation. Herding situations in 
financial liquidation of positions motivated by an unexpected increase 
of risk perception are called “irrational” contagion, for example by 
asymmetric information, by feedback of financial fluctuations (panic) or 
by generalisation of financial management standards (Bald, 2000). 
Different models are commented by Barberis and Thaler (Barberis, 2002). 
In this section we present models that they are useful, didactically 
or strategically, for the discussion about the effects of instability 
prevention and regulation in the global Financial System. These financial 
crisis models are of second generation, because they permit a better 
synthesis of fluctuation effects thanks to they do not affect to Real 
Economy. Three financial types of crisis, in function of its nature, are 
distinguished: of first generation or macroeconomic, characteristic until 
1980s, that affects to exchange rates and to balance of payments, 
generally by an inadequate combination of fiscal and monetary policies 
or they are preceded by a chronic public deficit (Krugman, 1979); of 
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second generation, characteristic in 1980s and 1990s, with net effects in 
Financial Economy because of the importance of free capital transfers 
and of financial globalisation (Obstfeld, 1994); and, of third generation or 
twins, that suppose a mix between currency and banking crises 
(Kaminsky, 1997). We work with the second typology of crises, that 
implies essentially financial effects.   
We carry out a strategic analysis as justification of actual 
regulation in globalised Financial System. We present this analysis in form 
of payoff matrix, using Game Theory for explaining, on one hand, 
national and international authorities action (regulation), and on the 
other hand, the different economic agents of market (efficiency). In this 
purpose, we divide the section in two: a model about capital 
movement control, and another about financial stability control.   
 
3.1 International Capital Movements Effects Model 
 
Foreseeable results of fiscal competence processes among 
national States can be analyzed basically from simple Game Theory 
models as the same as the ones that are used in fiscal decentralization 
(Álvarez, 2003; Zubirí, 1987). In this way, we can suppose that we have 
two countries A and B that submit to taxation the obtained earnings in 
their territory by residents in the other fiscal jurisdiction and that in design 
of their own tax system can adopt two different types of strategies: 
competitive (with purpose to attract foreign capital by an increment of 
the net profit value of taxes by means of the fiscal discount) or not 
competitive (or cooperative, designing fiscal system without keep in 
mind the possible attraction of foreign capital). Obtained results appear 
collected in payoff matrix of Table 2.2.   
 
Country B 
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 COMPETITION COOPERATION 
 
COMPETITION 
(4, 4) 
case a 
(7, 3) 
case b 
Country A 
COOPERATION 
(3, 7) 
case c 
(5, 5) 
case d 
Table 2.2 Payoff Matrix 
If it is supposed that both jurisdictions are symmetrical in all 
relevant characteristics and because of a country is affected by fiscal 
competence, countries are obliged to adopt a competitive strategy if 
the others also do it in order to do not lose resources. Then the case (a) 
(both countries compete because each one does the best for him, 
given what do its opponents) is the only equilibrium of Nash of this 
competitive game, for which the doubt is presented of which is the real 
incentive so that any of both countries initiate this process of 
competence that also it is known as competitive harmonization.   
Logically, the origin of this competitive process would be able to 
be owed to that be to broken symmetry conditions among countries 
(some countries would have more incentives than other to collaborate, 
and it is complex to determine and to distribute benefits of cooperation, 
what will complicate agreements), the possible break of pacts (given 
that although these were produced they would be with difficulty 
sustainable in the time by diverse motives as, for example, a crisis 
situation in a country can force it to compete) and the fact that 
governments can base on considerations of short-medium time limit (as 
is used to be in practice).   
Summarizing, there are several incentives so that cooperation 
among countries do not be produced (Zubirí, 1987). Finally, also the 
competence among countries by the attraction of foreign capital 
cannot be produced necessarily by tax reasons but by other motives as 
the protection of its banking system or of its financial markets as is the 
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case of various countries in the European Union. In practice, problems as 
double international imposition produces that mechanisms of 
coordination are established (methods of tax-exemption and of 
accusation) for the sake of unilateral character or in international 
accord framework with purpose to eliminate or at less to correct in part 
this problem.   
 
3.2 Financial Stability Effects Model 
 
In order to analyze stability in global Financial System, systemic risk 
possibility is considered. Furfine (Furfine, 1999) distinguishes two 
typologies: (i) a simultaneous crisis that affects to all market or (ii) a 
successive crisis where bankruptcy or difficulties of one or several 
institutions, businesses or economies affects to all system. We will analyze 
both possibilities, but studying only financial effects and considering that 
systemic crises can be avoided for a regulation or defence of Financial 
System by competent authorities. We follow a model of second 
generation similar to Krugman model (Krugman, 1998) and to Obstfeld 
ideas (Obstfeld, 1996) with a Financial System with competitive agents: 
Market 
 
DEFENCE NOT DEFENCE 
DEFENCE 
(0, 0) 
stability 
(-1, 1) 
speculation 
Authority 
 
NOT DEFENCE 
(1, -1) 
fluctuation 
(-1/2, -1/2) 
crisis 
Table 2. 3 Payoff Matrix (Short-term) 
Market 
 
DEFENCE NOT DEFENCE 
Authority 
DEFENCE (1, 1) (-1, 1/2) 
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stability speculation 
 
NOT DEFENCE 
(1/2, -1) 
fluctuation 
(1/2, 3/2) 
crisis recovery 
Table 2.4. Payoff Matrix (Long-term) 
In Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 we collect coordination effects and its 
lack in the actions of supervision and regulation authorities with market 
agents. The coordination effects can be so much short as long-term in 
financial stability. Both Tables collect the strategic aspects of stability 
defence of Financial System, which differ to short and long-term.   
In short-term it is observed a “prisoner dilemma”, where the only 
Nash equilibrium is to go toward crisis in a difficult situation, without 
regulator or supervisor wastes its resources defending the system against 
the attack of financial weakness by market (efficient) agents. The 
justification of this result is because in short-term speculation and 
forecast benefits of financial instability are higher than a stable Financial 
System. Financial adjustment in search of a greater efficiency does not 
generate enough profits in so short time, and then all agents would 
have losses. Nevertheless, speculation or financial instability produces a 
zero sum game, where who forecasts correctly the system direction 
earns erroneously resources used by the others.   
In long-term, because of that there is time for recovery or for 
significant generation of profits by stability, two Nash equilibria exist. The 
first is the same to short-term of not system defence in a difficult situation, 
allowing an adjustment towards a more efficiency system. The second is 
an efficient defence of system with greater profits by stability continuity.   
This strategic analysis reveals the best supervisor and regulation 
action to prevent financial fluctuations or to defend its stability, which is 
to encourage a long-term strategy in risk control and management of 
financial participants with a credible, healthy and efficient system. The 
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Nash equilibrium of stability in long-term can be justified in three different 
ways: 
A. By non-simultaneity of decision between the authority and the 
market with a leader than the other imitates. In the case that authority 
was the leader, it is interested in defending stability of Financial System 
because solvency and a “good” economic growth imply larger and 
sustained public income. Then, the equilibrium is (defend, defend) or 
long-term stability. Nevertheless, it can be supposed that market is not 
interested in defending Financial System stability and it tries to obtain 
profits of system instability or to force efficient reforms. In this case, if 
market was the leader, in one difficult situation, would begin not 
defending the system and causing the crisis. 
B. By existence of asymmetric information that causes that the player 
with smaller information imitates the strategy of the other. In other 
words, there is a similar situation with previous case of leader – follower. 
Then, results are in function of the player with larger information and of 
the confidence in system stability. 
C. By self-fulfilled expectations. In this case is considered that market 
and authority act simultaneously in the election of long-term 
equilibrium. This equilibrium will be conditioned to existing expectations 
about future system stability. Expectations will be self-fulfilled because 
financial agents will believe their occurrence, and they will act in 
consequence. It is the typical situation of models of “second 
generation”. In our model the reason for system defence by the 
authority and by the market are associated to profits of not using their 
resources and the long-term stable growth of public and private 
income. The third element of circular logic of this “second generation” 
model is that authority defend cost is greater when market thinks that its 
defence will be fruitless (financial weakness), because of lack of 
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resources (damaged economy) or of lack of confidence (system 
inefficiency).   
The three commented possibilities collect, of a synthetic way, 
action lines of Basel II proposals. In the first place, that authority (system 
regulator and supervisor) is who takes the initiative in control of Financial 
System stability and health. Basel II purposes a supervision of private risk 
management, it incentives more sophisticated and internal models for 
risk measurement and management, and a regulation of “important” 
risk: market, credit and operational risk. In second place, Basel II 
defences a larger information transparency because, in this way, so 
much financial market as authority, they know solvency situation of 
system, improving market efficiency. Excessively risked and fraudulent 
operations do not survive to market arbitrage and supervision control. In 
third and last place, Basel II facilitates to financial authorities the 
possibility of creating a confidence environment for system stability, 
thanks to international coordination in fluctuation and solvency control.   
Nevertheless, self-fulfilled expectations cause some Basel II 
difficulties or lacks to guarantee Financial System stability. There are 
financial phenomena that mine investor confidence in belief of long-
term system stability. This problem is consequence of procyclicality of risk 
measures, management and control, and by crisis feedback caused 
because of most of financial agents follow similar risk standards.   
Procyclicality causes that in economic growth epochs or in 
expansive stock market cycle provisions demands are reduced (smaller 
risk), because risk measurement is based, when it is estimated internally, 
in the most probable event (Point In Time, PIT), which is different with 
cycle evolution. External agencies of risk measurement are used to 
following an approach of the most unfavorable possibility (Through The 
Cycle, TTC), with an unchanged probability along the cycle. But this last 
case can carry to an infravaluation of real risk in its stress testing because 
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when “bad things” are higher than a threshold all system falls. Borio, 
Furfine and Lowe (Borio, 2001) carry out an extensive study of 
procyclicality effects of control measures, which can derive in a 
financial crisis by greater demands of provisions and cascades of 
liquidations by a risk rise.  In other hand, similar risk monitoring and risk 
management standards foment herding behaviour in financial trade, 
generating financial bubbles and panics. Moreover contagion effects 
appear among investors with different standards of risk measurement, 
with different horizon, with different profits and losses distribution, with 
different portfolio diversification…, because of the generation of a 
downwards or upwards trend in all financial products.   
Symptoms (causes) of financial instability and its possibilities of 
prevention (recommendations and Basel II) can be summarized in the 
following Table 2.5: 
 
 
 
CAUSES RECOMMENDATIONS BASEL II 
Free capital 
movement 
International coordination 
Tax harmonization 
--- 
Economic cycle 
and expansive 
credit 
Anticyclicality provisions 
Sophistication of risk measures and 
control 
To improve credit risk methods 
PIT Methodology 
Stress testing 
Benchmarking 
 
Financial Market 
deregulation 
Regulation to produce positive 
externalities with international 
coordination and control 
Risk measurement and 
management supervision 
Market discipline 
Financial 
liberalization 
Government intervention to guide 
liberalization and to ensure fiscal 
and monetary discipline 
--- 
Procyclicality of risk 
measures/standards 
Anticyclicality provisions 
Flexibility of risk measures 
Sophistication and diversity of 
risk standards (measures and 
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Fiscal measures for intertemporal 
adaptation of capital 
requirements 
Averaging measures over the 
cycle 
Contracyclical adjust over the 
cycle of the prudential parameter 
To improve credit risk methods 
management) 
 
Contagion effects 
Systemic risk 
Diversification and no-standard 
portfolios selection 
To improve credit risk methods 
Internal risk management 
 
Investment herding 
behaviour 
Portfolio diversification Flexibility in horizons and risk 
correlations 
Internal risk control 
Market discipline 
Macroeconomic 
expectations error 
Risk evaluation error 
Sophistication in risk measures and 
control 
Information transparency 
Internal risk control 
Higher information 
transparency Market discipline 
Table 2.5. Symptoms and Prevention of Financial Instability. Source: 
Mayer, 1999; Borio, 2001; and Goodhart, 2004. 
 
Conclusions 
 
We have considered strategic action of the three stages that take 
part of Financial System: the authority or International Institutions, Market, 
and National States. Financial stability, in the informative and 
dependence context of Globalisation, is subordinated to former action. 
There are strategic incentives to defend or attack financial stability, 
according to the solvency, credibility and/or inefficiencies of Financial 
System.  
The optimum design of tax politics in terms of efficiency and equity 
in an international context of mobility of capital requires to establish (i) 
some basic principles of international tax assignment in direct taxation, 
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(ii) the definition of coordination mechanisms that avoids double 
international imposition and (iii) the establishment of tax neutrality 
criteria (efficiency) in the international allocation of capital as equity 
among individuals and countries. The paralysis of fiscal process of 
harmonization in direct taxes especially in the case of European Union 
has caused a generalised discount of capital taxation in order to avoid 
national capital exits. 
Foreseeable results of fiscal competence processes among 
national States can be analyzed basically from simple Game Theory 
models as the same as the ones that are used in fiscal decentralization. 
In this way, obtained results from payoff matrix if it is supposed that both 
jurisdictions are symmetrical in all relevant aspects does that the case in 
which both countries compete is the only equilibrium of Nash. 
Nevertheless, the competence by attraction of foreign capital cannot 
be produced necessarily by tax reasons and it implies agreements to 
avoid the double international imposition. 
In relation with Financial System stability, public authorities and 
market actions are constrained to recommendations of New Basel 
Capital Accord of Basel II, by its large acceptance so much by 
International Institutions as by national States, that it derives in common 
international regulation of Financial System. Basel II is born for the lack of 
financial risk measures and management of fluctuation and crisis 
prevention. To surpass these lacks a higher sophistication in quantitative 
risk estimation is proposed in management models, supervision and 
public information.   
Effectiveness of these measures and recommendations can be 
analyzed strategically simplifying the actors in authority (International 
Institutions) and in market (economic agents), where it is deduced that 
long-term stability and efficiency depend on Financial System credibility 
and solvency. It is observed that financial variable fluctuation depends 
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on rumours, opinions, legislation…, that although they do not affect to 
Real Economy, they are the base of economic agents’ expectations 
and of their financial action. 
Therefore, we can conclude that effectiveness in defence of 
solvency and efficiency of Financial System is consequence in crises of 
“second generation”, of strategic considerations of the participants. 
System instability can be affect to other investors, sectors or economies 
by contagion effects derived from international relations of 
Globalisation, from correlations among investment or hedging 
macroportfolios, from herding behaviour, from generalization of similar 
risk management standards…   
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CHAPTER 6 
HOW TO ASSURE YOUR PERSONAL 
FINANCIAL WEALTH: THE ANSWER IS 
ACTIVISM 
 
Heriberto García 
 
Texas A&M International University 
 
Abstract: There is no doubt how the investors are worried about 
the payback of their investments, part of the relationship between the 
payback and the risk assumed in any investment is related to the 
conflict between the management and the stockholders. In recent 
years the agency problem has become more important due mainly to 
investment frauds.  
The objective of this chapter is to discover how the activism can 
assure your personal financial wealth, related mainly to the process of 
investment and how to control this process, investments related to risky 
assets as stocks and bonds, in a broad perspective describes the 
interaction and relationship between isolated investor and the target 
firm. The chapter is divided in four major parts, in the beginning we 
explain the definitions and concepts related to Agency Theory and 
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Activism, then we support and explain why and how the concept of 
Activism has been so important in the last decade, the third part of the 
chapter we explain the investment process and how we can apply the 
Activism concept into our personal investment portfolio, the last part of 
the chapter we define and describe how we can manage a design 
investment portfolio based mainly from Activism perspective. 
 
Keywords: Activism, Institutional Investors. Corporate Governance,  
Agency Theory, Investments, Portfolio, Public Corporation, Principal, 
Agent, Credit Agency, Accounting Firm 
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1. Definitions and concepts of Agency Theory and Activism. The conflict  
 
There is a conflict between management and shareholders due to 
different characteristics and interests according with Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). One side acts mostly as a consumer path, trying to 
maximizing their establishment and the income, the management knows 
the day to day operations and how to make new business or projects, 
but lacks the capital to make it real. New projects or bigger business 
means bigger salaries, additional bonus or any other no pecuniary 
benefits, the indifference economic curve will be related to effort and 
reward. On the other side are the stockholders, they invest the capital 
need it to increase operations and profits, also they will be wait for the 
payback and the additional return related with the initial and additional 
investments, the stockholders can be related to either debt or equity. The 
indifference economic curve is related to payback, risk and return of 
their investments. The conflict rise because at the end, management will 
be permanently keeps their jobs and salaries, with the minimum effort. 
The opposite side the stockholders, need someone who can care and 
duty their investment, maximizing the value of the firm and at the same 
time assuring to solve the future demand of the firm today. This 
relationship generates potential opportunistic behavior of management 
and additional agency cost due to monitoring and control of the firm. 
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There is an inevitable attribute for the public corporation, which is the 
implicit separation of the ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932), 
that’s emerge to us the problem of agency. At the beginning of any 
investment or business, mostly of the time the entrepreneur and the 
management are the same person, the value of the firm, the future, the 
risk and return are related to the level of effort, expenditures and new 
projects, as we can conclude all the variables are related to the same 
person or family. The problem emerge when the small or family business 
become bigger and with a lot of business opportunities to keep growing 
in the future, that’s when the additional stockholders are invited to 
participate in this new exploration. They will invest and solve the problem 
of scarce capital resources but they will need someone to assure their 
investments. By the other hand, the initial entrepreneur will be sold part or 
completely his business to realize his wealth or to own part of the bigger 
business instead own one small business.  
Because now the business is divided into two owners or more, the 
initial entrepreneur and the new stockholders, both sides needs someone 
to care day to day business operations and to assure the future of the 
company. The new management emerges with new institutional and 
professional processes, at this point and at the same time the 
stockholders (including the initial entrepreneur) needs also someone to 
control the management. Needs someone not related and not 
subordinated to management as well to follow and control the 
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operations and monetary transactions of the firm, moreover someone to 
assure the management is focused or concentrated in increase the 
business in to the future. According to Jensen and Meckling, (1976) the 
agency relationship is related to one contract under which the principal 
engages the agent to perform some type of service or activity 
according to his/her specific interests, including authority and decisions. 
The agent is called management; the principal is called the shareholder 
or the finance supplier.  
During the process, the principal will motivate the agent to perform 
specific objectives, using several means such as compensations, 
monitoring, and measure of the agent’s behavior. By using those 
mechanisms the principal can assure his/her own wealth in the long run. 
The agent is, however, motivated by self-interest and is assumed being 
rational or to being risk averse. The situation can also result in a conflict 
between the objectives of the principal and the self interest of the 
agent. 
The agency conflict has been analyzed since Adam Smith (1776) 
and Coase (1937) and has emerged as an important framework to help 
researches understand the nature of the principal-agent relationship. 
Different perspectives have been analyzed since then. The corporation 
can be a nexus of contracts as Jensen et al perceived or as a system of 
volunteer exchange as Alchain and Demsetz (1972) concluded. 
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Following the agency theory, the corporation is viewed as a “nexus 
of contracts” between agents, the principal and other people interested 
in the firm, such as banks, public institutions or venture capitalists. 
Conflicts of interest can arise due to the implicit relationship between 
these parties.  
A conflict may also arise due to different people with different 
expectations (agent principal). One possible solution of this conflict is 
writing contract, but in a day-to-day relationship, it is quite impossible to 
write a complete contract with explicit planned behavior of the agent 
and principal relationship. Because one of the possible solutions is a 
contract, but contracts have considerable limitations, then other 
potential solutions may arise during the process. The first solution to the 
problem is the separation of ownership and control. Hire new 
management and put someone to control it.  
The basic definition of the conflict between, the agent and the 
principal is the potential economic loss of the principal. This potential loss 
is caused by the agent. Potential loss can be identified as a loss of 
wealth, decreasing the value of the firm or inefficient application of cash 
flow according with Marnet, (2005).  
Also the potential loss can be caused by agent opportunism (not 
necessary operative expenditures), agent incompetence, agent 
corruption, inadequate decision process or inadequate disclose 
information process. At the end of the process the potential loss will be 
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reduced to loss of principal wealth as is described by Maniam, 
Subramaniam, Johnson (2006) this our base ground to support this part of 
this chapter.  
In the last decade one of the issues that most has being affected to 
investors is Agent Corruption, cases like Enron, World Com, Xerox, Waste 
Management, Adelphia, Tyco Co, Global Crossing and lately Madoff 
Ponzi Scheme. All this events reflects how initial conflict can jeopardize 
the wealth of the investors in to long run. The fundamental question is 
why and how this event happens when we have several mechanisms to 
assure well being of investor investments?  
The answer relies in how financial and business system works. There 
are some regulation entities which assure transparency and legal 
procedures that any business must follow in order to be inside law. At this 
level everything is related to information, quantitatively or qualitatively. 
The word “assure” mostly of the time are related to external agencies 
that we call risk analyst, credit rating agency or accounting firm.  
Management informs and provided data to external entities and at the 
end they analyze and evaluate the information to make final report or 
emit conclusions about business. Mostly of the time the investors rely their 
decisions based on these external entities reports. At the end the 
conclusion from these agencies can quote, “based on the information 
from the company…..” “According with the information given by the 
Management then…….” In practical or pragmatic point of view is some 
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kind difficult to any external agency to discover a fraud or misuse of 
resources, because in order to identify misuse monetary resources or 
unethical expenditures it should be revised the day to day monetary 
transaction, and if we assume that there is thousands of every day 
transactions, it is just like try to find a “needle in a haystack”.  
Moreover, the everyday transactions, monetary transactions or 
expenses can be legal or seems ethical. But that doesn’t assure that the 
management is not colluded with any external entity or supplier. This is 
the most dangerous actions or behavior that as investors can face.  
Activism can be defined by the increasing engagement of the 
investors inside corporate governance issues of the company, according 
with Black (1997), activism involve changes in corporate governance 
issues inside the company or propose changes to board of directors to 
get management or strategy changes. All this changes are according 
with the public firm and according with the law and regulation entities.  
 
2. Importance of Activism 
 
Analyzing the past decade, linking fraud events and loss of wealth of 
investors we are far away to control agency problem, more over even 
with new laws, new regulatory procedures and new regulatory entities, 
the agency problem has been increase during the last years.  
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Activism is the procedure to be in close or near to the target firm, 
close or near means to ask the questions and actions taken by the 
management, it is the involvement of the major owners to the decisions 
and actions taken by the management. The activism mostly of the time 
is made by large and wealthy pension funds, when the pension fund 
identify one company with constantly decreasing financial performance 
then they start the process of activism, the company is called target firm. 
Many questions emerge in this relationship. Why the pension funds just sell 
off the stocks and buy another with better performance? If the target 
firm decreases the financial performance then the product market or the 
financial market will respond according with the economic forces?  
The Pension Fund or any Institutional Investors mostly of the time are in 
the long view perspective, this means they don’t need the money today, 
they decide to increase the involvement with the target firm because if 
they activate the sell off process of target firm stock then they can loss 
more than already losses, remember is not just one pension fund it could 
be several investors at the same time resulting in a catastrophic drop of 
the stock price. The involvement process takes time to the investors to 
really understand the actions, the strategic plan and the consequences 
of decisions taken in the past, but also to understand the potential 
financial results in the near future and of course if there is any positive 
result in their investments. Because they can wait in time and they can 
involve more closely with the management to improve the financial 
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performance then they decide to do not activate massive sell off of the 
target firm.  
In the short run, the product market can take advantage of the 
target firm situation but if the analysis or changes promoting by the 
management do not result as the expectation then the investors could 
use the right to promote changes to the board of directors and inside 
the management. As well in the short run the financial market will punish 
the stock price of the target firm resulting in different potential scenarios 
the most common is the takeover or hostile acquisition from one 
competitor or even private investor groups. In any scenario product 
market or financial market effect the institutional investor or pensions 
fund will be affected negatively the wealth of their investors.  
In the long run, if the involvement promotes changes inside the 
board of directors as well in the management then the firm will take 
strategic changes and new opportunities to improve the financial 
performance and in time the stock price.  
According with Karpoff (1999) and Romano(2000) there is several 
changes that are promoting by the institutional investment and pension 
funds, they can promote 1) New CEO 2) Promote changes to the 
members of the board of directors 3) Promote new control mechanism 
4) Make changes to the compensation plans 5) Promote arrangements 
between the stockholders and the company 6) Restructuring  the 
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company or changes into the private contracts between management 
and company  7) Promote new members of the board of directors.  
Mostly of the time depending the particular situation of the target 
firm the changes promoting by the institutional investors results in better 
and more efficient company and of course in better stock price, but 
between the changes and the results there is the variable time, that’s 
the institutional investors major advantage. In our case and then the 
purpose of this chapter is related to how to take advantage into this 
particular situation. 
Summarizing, there is the activism process to promote changes inside 
the firm as well there is the variable time between activism and potential 
benefits. In this particular situation the firm and for us the stock price is 
more undervalued than overvalued situation. Mostly of the time in this 
situation the financial markets reacts aggressively and slide the stock 
price below the fair value or below the net present value of the stock. 
 
3. Investment process, control and Activism and the potential 
applications in Investments 
 
In Finance we use mostly of the time two forces, we use the greed to 
analyze and promote new potential firm in our portfolio, but always at 
the same time we use the opposite force which is the fear. Both forces 
react according with the data and financial information that we have 
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available at that particular time but some time wins only one which 
means sale or buy if the forces are equal then we can wait to better 
times. 
This part of the chapter assume that you already have the portfolio or 
already have the personal investment profile, which means mostly of the 
cases know as investors our best fit relationship between risk and returns 
as well the time perspective framework. The typical portfolio maximizes 
the relationship between risk and return forces, including typical 
constrains such time, % weight investing in stock, risk tolerance and 
sectors to invest.  
When one stock price doesn’t reflect the fair value or net present 
value then we can decide to buy or sell, mostly based in our investment 
position. But in our case, target firm will be below the fair market value 
because the negative perspective of company and poor financial 
performance; just consider the target firm with a lot of changes coming 
in the near future due to promotions from the institutional investors also 
consider the particular situation of the company with below fair value 
stock price and some investors sell off positions, at this point the target 
firm is our opportunity.  
Then now consider your own time framework tolerance, this target 
firm will change in the future, how long time?  How much improvement? 
Why should be positive change? All answers are related to the particular 
product and financial market position of the firm, the bigger the change 
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the longer the time, the lower the price than the fair value then better 
returns, also at the end companies don’t hire management with low and 
poor performance in their past.  
We can divide the change in two major issues, the first one is, if the 
company its affected because the product or business problem then the 
risk will be higher, product or business problem means the consumer 
preferences are changing to the competition due to lack of quality, lack 
of competitiveness or the products firms doesn’t meet the consumer 
expectations. At this level it means drastically changes in production, 
marketing or even CEO’s. The second major issue is business problem; this 
means that firm doesn’t have the (internal or external) capabilities or 
resources to keep operating the business in the future, this problem 
required more money, more time and big changes inside the firm. Mostly 
of the time target firms meet into this both problems and consider 
minimum 12 month investment perspective.  
If the firm it’s affected because minor changes, such atypical 
economic environment or temporary competition effectiveness or short 
run lack of product improvement, then the changes will be quickly as 
well the results this is the best time period opportunity because in at 
minimum 6 months the results will come out.  
We always can expect positive changes in one target firm, because 
first, if there is some not long run solution to the company then the 
investor will make a massive sell off, and you will find historical low stock 
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prices as well same management and same results. Remember target 
firm means companies which reflect potential improvements in their 
actual conditions. Also target firms opt for changes but not in the entire 
management or board of directors, they make changes according with 
the problem.  
Target firms are our opportunity in our portfolios because 1) We can 
relay that institutional investors may affect the actual and future 
management and board of directors, 2) The process of improvement 
relays to improve business and operative results and as well the financial 
results in certain period of time. 3) Initially target firm stock price is 
undervalued or with below fair market value, in time the stock price will 
increase as well reducing the business risk. 4) The monitoring process in 
those promoting changes to target firm will be by the institutional 
investors or pension fund including all the infrastructure, technology and 
experience in previous activism process.  
 
4. Management and portfolio design based in Activism perspective 
 
The investments require long view perspective, in our case if we 
construct long time portfolio then we should explore the Activism process 
in our investment activity to full fill our risk return profile. Depend our own 
constrains about our actual portfolio we can set the requirement risk and 
return best fit combination to our own profile, but beside this we can also 
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have some space inside our portfolio to explore those target companies. 
According with Nelson and Peterson (2004) they did not find sufficient 
empirical evidence to link activism with firm performance, but their study 
shows results with a window no longer than 100 days, according with the 
same authors they find better financial results in longer perspective 
mostly of the cases years. Several similar studies show same results.  
How we can implement in our portfolio this approach? How we can 
decide the target firm? The answers relays mainly in our actual portfolio 
profile, we can include some % weighted space in our actual portfolio 
dedicated specially in target firms. Also we can respect some constraints 
such sectors, time, risk return target firm profile or any additional 
restrictions previously defined in our portfolio. We can search target firms 
based on the Council Institutional Investors list, which includes California 
Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), Teachers Insurance 
Annuity Association College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF).  
Besides their (CalPERS and TIAA-CREF) future perspective about 
target firm, we must perform our typical risk return analysis of the stock 
price as well the recent financial performance of the target firm. After 
that we should analyze those changes promoted by the institutional 
investors and our time framework perspective to conclude if the target 
firm fits our actual portfolio needs. Additionally we should keep 
monitoring the typical Security Exchange Commission (SEC) 8K reports 
which include any disclosure of important events from target firm; this is 
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the typical maintenance process that we need for any portfolio 
investment. We can repeat the process according with our portfolio rules 
and constrains.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Poorly performing companies have poorly corporate governance. 
Some time the actions for the institutional investors like “wall street walk”  
or “Voting with your feet” are not he most efficient way to keep the 
desirable risk and return combination. Everything relays how we can 
improve the company performance; the institutional investors use their 
rights using the technique Target Firms. Target firms are our prospectus to 
include in our actual portfolio, are our investments opportunities to 
analyze and include in our actual risk and return profile. Target firms are 
companies with product or business problems which the institutional 
investors cannot activate massive sell off because: time perspective, 
future opportunity of the business after changing management or board 
of directors and better times to sell off the stock.  
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